

eNOTICE

European Network Of CBRN Training Centres

D4.9 eNOTICE Recommendations for CBRN R&D and CBRN policies. Version 2

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¹ In the project Grant Agreement the abbreviation for Centre of Excellence is spelled CoE, according to NATO terminology it has to spell COE. Therefore, in the main body of this document the abbreviation follows NATO rules.

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Executive Summary

This document is Deliverable 4.9 (eNOTICE Recommendations for CBRN R&D and CBRN policies. Version 2) of eNOTICE, a European Horizon 2020 EC funded project, under the Grant Agreement n° 740521.

This document continues the exploration of the European and national policy context and relevance of eNOTICE to the objectives of the European policy regarding CBRN defence training centres, testing and demonstration sites' role in CBRN preparedness, response and recovery, expansion of the project scope with the collaboration with DG DEVCO, discussions at the DG HOME Community of Users on secure, safe and resilient societies (CoU) sessions dedicated to CBRN defence policy, civil-military and international cooperation. Then the deliverable presents the detailed report on the policy meeting with representatives of German national/regional/local authorities, both civilian and military, that took place during the eNOTICE Joint Activity in Dortmund, Germany, on September 20, 2019. The results, major key points, conclusions and way forward considerations are summarised at the end of the document. Along with the main advantages of the eNOTICE network recognized by all stakeholders including policy makers – gaining knowledge, learning from each other, exchanging of practices, procedures, lecturers, trainees, trainers, identifying common standards (formal and informal), increasing interoperability of national and EU actors, there is a number of challenges that have to be taken into account. The challenges include personnel resources and time required to maintain the network activities; lack of financial resources, including budget for travels to trainings abroad; language barrier; legal framework and cultural differences between countries. Civil-military and international cooperation are recognized as an absolute must, however civil-military cooperation still lacks an overall overarching concept guiding both military and civilian actors and defining their collaboration at all levels, facilitating communication, interoperability, joint training. eNOTICE is in very good position to foster and promote this mechanism by networking the actors. eNOTICE network needs solid sustainability roadmap well ahead the end of the project to ensure the network functioning afterward. It is important to put in place the formal central administration, one central contact point of the network and the whole structure and functioning independent of particular personal contacts in member organizations, because staff changes very often, especially in military organizations. The major recommendations are related to linking with all existing professional networks, such as national associations of firefighters, etc.; better targeted dissemination of the eNOTICE network to the national actors including the national focal points to relevant EU CBRN defence related programmes like the EU CBRN Action Plan; look into legal constraints in each country; encompass and take advantage of differences between network members and not try to unify all, since the strength is in the diversity.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Allied Administrative Publication
AJP	Allied Joint Publication
AKNZ	Akademie für Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz (Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defence)
ATF	Analytical Task Force
BBK	Das Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe (Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance)
BSPP	Brigade de sapeurs-pompiers de Paris (Paris fire brigade)
BMPM	Bataillon de marins-pompiers de Marseille
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS	Communications and Information Systems
CMI	Civil-Military Interaction
COMPASS	Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support
CoU	Community of Users on Secure, Safe and Resilient Societies
CS	Combat Support
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSS	Combat Service Support

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EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EADRCC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
FF	Fire fighters
FNC	Framework Nations Concept
HN	Host Nation
IFR	Institute for Fire and Rescue Technology
IO	International Organisation
JESIP	Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles
JFC	Joint Force Command
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JTF	Joint Task Force
NAC	North-Atlantic Council
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NMAs	NATO Military Authorities
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPLAN	Operation Plan
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PSYOP	Psychological Operation
SAMU	Service d'Aide Médicale Urgente (Emergency medical Service)
SDIS	Service Départemental d'Incendie et de Secours
SGDSN	The General Secretariat of Defence and National Security
SOCC	Special Operations Component Command
SOF	Special Operations Forces
TC	Training centre
TTE	Tactical Training Events
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, Procedures
WFD	Water Framework Directive
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

1 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

This deliverable presents further findings and results of the work under the Task 4.3 Identification of opportunities to strengthen policies and recommendations for R&D – M3-M60: UCL (lead); VESTA, ARMINES, SIC, JCBRND COE, UNITOV. UCL leads, based on its experience in R&D and policy initiatives. VESTA, ARMINES, SIC, JCBRND COE and UNITOV contribute with their respective knowledge on civil and military CBRN defence policies and on needs for CBRN R&D.

Having identified in D4.8 (produced by eNOTICE consortium a year ago) civil-military and international cooperation as one of the most important trends in CBRN defence policy, the recent findings at security stakeholders' meetings further proved this topic as a priority that needs to be further explored and developed. eNOTICE, being an example of efficient civil-military cooperation with three military training centres² in the consortium, is committed to contribute substantially and deepen civil-military cooperation by means of the network of the CBRN training centres. Civil-military and international (cross-border) cooperation have been extensively discussed within CBRN theme at the 12th and the 13th meeting of the Community of Users for Secure, Safe and Resilient Societies (December 3, 2018, March 26-27, 2019 respectively). Several eNOTICE partners participated in these meetings, and the corresponding sessions were co-chaired by JCBRND COE (Col. Wolfgang Reich) and UCL (Dr Olga Vybornova).

In the context of promoting greater innovation in European common security and defence policy (CSDP) (see https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en), civil-military cooperation is most important in the field of dual-use research. When we bring together different types of stakeholders, civilian and military, we have much stronger capacity to identify topics that have a chance to get access to different types of stakeholders, and to have, at the end, more chance to be positively perceived by the users. Technologies developed this way will find easier way to the market.

CBRN field is one of the areas of dual-use research and technologies for civilian security and military users. The overall aim is to prevent duplication between defence and civilian research to save resources, and to improve civil-military interoperability. There is more and more interest and understanding of the necessity of civil-military cooperation, especially in such fields as CBRN, consequence management where it is most useful to share practices, share intelligence and knowledge, training, pool resources, infrastructure.

Within the context of counteracting and mitigating the exposition of local populations to a major accidental or intentional release of toxic industrial chemical or biological threats with a cross-border dimension, a civil-military cooperation allows to deploy adequate logistics support and to share standing operating procedures (SOP) (ref. NATOTerm Record 5526), with mutual improved efficiency. This was recently underpinned by Salisbury Novichok poisoning, Ricin terrorist plot attack in Cologne, and Poison blackmail attempt targeting major food producers across the EU. Managing a large-size, high-impact, cross-border crisis of this kind requires a rapid and coordinated public sector and military response with advanced equipment and technologies, which would improve the overall response capacity for decontaminating and treating the victims, and for recovery.

As the ultimate goal of the eNOTICE project is strengthening national and cross-border capacity for CBRN incidents preparedness (incl. training) and response, this task will contribute to this goal through the identification of opportunities to align policies and recommendations for national, European and international R&D. Input will be gathered from the evaluation and

² The JCBRN Defence COE is not to be seen as a purely training centre, Training, Exercises and Education is one out of three pillars besides Transformation Support and Operation Support.

follow up of the joint activities (Task 4.2) and from discussions with EU policy makers, such as representatives from DG HOME, DG ECHO, DG DEVCO, JRC and others. In the light of civil-military cooperation, input might also be gathered from discussions with NATO and national military stakeholders, CBRN Defence related NATO bodies such as the JCBRND COE, the Joint CBRN Defence Capability Development Group and its related panels and bodies related to civil-military cooperation within NATO Headquarters and the NATO command structure.

At the first JCBRND COE Advisors Conference on civil-military cooperation in case of large scale CBRN incidents including cross-border operations, conducted by the JCBRND COE in September 2019, it has been agreed by the high-level NATO representatives from NATO HQ and SHAPE that for the JCBRND COE Advisors Conference next year representatives from the EU will be invited.

1.1 EUROPEAN CBRN DEFENCE POLICIES

Considering that CBRN incidents might affect different domains and are particularly impactful for critical infrastructures, it is essential for policymakers to integrate the CBRN component, where possible, across different policies. Currently [7] identifies a variety of EU directives and plans in place related to CBRN defence:

- Seveso Directives I, II, III [9]. These are the EU guidelines that intend to minimise CBRN risks and prevent major accidents from happening. The Seveso Directives help Member States to develop response and mitigation measures. In order to maximise its impact, the Seveso directive has been integrated in other EU policies such as the Union's Civil Protection Mechanism, the Security Union Agenda and the Regulation on the classification, labelling and packaging of chemicals, among others.
- Drinking Water Directive [10] concerns the quality of drinking water (for human consumption). The Directive intends to protect human health from any contamination of water. A recast of the current Directive is expected soon.
- Water Framework Directive (WFD) [11]. The WFD is the European Union's overarching framework for water policy. It aims to improve the ecological and chemical quality of ground and surface water (rivers, lakes, transitional waters and coastal waters) in the EU.
- EU Critical Infrastructure Directive (ECI) [12] establishes the process for identifying and designating European critical infrastructures. In addition, the ECI lays out the approach for improving the protection of these infrastructures.
- CBRN Action Plan to enhance preparedness against CBRN risks [1]. The Action Plan intends to enhance European cooperation in order to strengthen CBRN security. It is specifically focused on prevention, preparedness and response to CBRN threats and terrorism attacks and aims to reduce the accessibility of CBRN materials, ensure a more robust preparedness for and response to CBRN incidents, build stronger internal and external links with key regional- and EU partners and enhance our knowledge of CBRN risks.
- EU Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives [8]. The EU presents 48 measures related to prevention, detection and response to risks related to explosives. In addition, measures related to horizontal aspects such as information sharing mechanisms are presented.

- The establishment of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) [by the Council in December 2017 has raised cooperation on defence among the participating EU Member States to a new level. Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty on European Union (article 42.6, 46 and Protocol 10), PESCO is a framework and process to deepen defence cooperation between those EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so. 25 EU Member States have joined PESCO and subscribed to more binding commitments to invest, plan, develop and operate defence capabilities more together, within the Union framework. The objective is to jointly arrive at a coherent full spectrum of defence capabilities available to Member States for national and multinational (EU, NATO, UN, etc.) missions and operations. This will enhance the EU's capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection of the EU citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending. An initial list of 17 projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council on 6 March 2018. A second batch of 17 additional projects to be developed under PESCO was adopted by the Council on 19 November 2018. One of the priorities is CBRN - The CBRN Surveillance as a Service (CBRN SaaS) project will establish a persistent and distributed manned-unmanned sensor network consisting of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) that will be interoperable with legacy systems to provide a Recognized CBRN Picture to augment existing Common Operational Pictures used for EU missions and operations. Austria as lead nation for this project requested the JCBRND COE to assist in this project and the Centre is now joining the working group developing the capability requirements. This also serves as a practical example of NATO-EU cooperation where an eNOTICE consortium member is involved.

1.2 NATIONAL CBRN DEFENCE POLICIES

The German CBRN defence policy has been particularly discussed at the Policy Meeting in Dortmund on September 20, 2019. The report and discussion of results of this meeting are presented in Section 2 of this deliverable.

- *Belgium*

The new CBRN expertise centre within the National Crisis Centre: concept note

1. Mission Statement

In this context, CBRN emergency situations are understood as emergency situations with the release of CBRN compounds either accidental or natural (industrial accident, natural risk, ...) or resulting from malevolent action/terrorism, or involving military devices /facilities and which require coordination or management at the national level

Considering:

- the need to operationalize and harmonize emergency plans for CBRN emergencies by integrating safety and security
- the need to train the actors involved in CBRN emergency plans, first of all the first line responders

- the need to integrate development research results into CBRN multidisciplinary contingency plans
- the need for immediate support to crisis management support with CBRN expertise
- the need for international collaboration on CBRN risks and emergencies
- the unique expertise of the National Crisis Centre in CBRN emergency preparedness and management, regarding both safety and security aspects,
- the location of the Crisis Centre in the centre of Brussels, in the immediate vicinity of the European institutions.

The CBRN expertise centre has been set up within the Belgian National Crisis Centre, firstly for national purposes and possibly with a view to becoming a European CBRN centre. The centre is a national platform in which experts from knowledge centres, operational services and training centres collaborate in an integrated environment with the responsible authorities in CBRN emergency preparedness and crisis management.

The centre of expertise is therefore part of the Crisis Centre's Emergency Planning Department, which is responsible for organising emergency preparedness (including CBRN both safety and security emergencies) at the national level.

Missions of the centre of expertise:

- gathers information and develops knowledge about CBRN risks
- makes information/knowledge about CBRN risks available to the Emergency Planning Department (and by extension to other partners)
- provides advice and support to initiatives and projects developed by the Emergency Planning Department (and, by extension, to other partners), at the request of the Department as part of multidisciplinary emergency plans (Nuclear Emergency Plan, CBRN Emergency Plans, ...).
- contributes to the development of an integrated safety/security vision for CBRN risk management
- supports crisis management in real CBRN emergency situations

2. Fields of activity

On the basis of its missions, the centre of expertise can be active in the following areas:

(a) Operationalization of emergency plans

- Identification and analysis of CBRN risks and their potential impact,
- Elaboration and harmonization of CBRN emergency plans with particular attention to the integration of safety and security aspects, from a strategic and operational point of view,
- Development/implementation of operational plans, procedures and tools at the level of the actors concerned by CBRN emergency plans, primarily for first-aid and first responders,
- Dissemination of information to the population and consultation with civil society groups on CBRN risks and types of behaviour to be adopted,
- Training and education of actors, primarily first-aid responders /first-line responders
- CBRN emergency plan exercise and its evaluation,
- The recovery phase of CBRN emergency situations,

(b) Consequence management support in the event of a real CBRN emergency

- Rapid support with CBRN expertise brought to strategic managers in the event of real emergencies,


- Evaluation of crisis management in real emergencies and identification of lessons learned

(c) Research and development

- Integration of research and development results into CBRN emergency plans and crisis management: good practices, specific tools, training, exercise evaluation methods, etc.

(d) International dimension

- Collaboration with knowledge centres/training centres in the European Member States in the context of international research and development,
- Mapping of collaboration with CBRN crisis centres in European member states,
- The provision of CBRN expertise to other Member States in preparation for and in the event of real emergencies,
- Contribution to European initiatives and projects, in particular within the framework of the European Commission's call for proposals on CBRN.



3. Basic principles of organization of the CBRN expertise centre

- The centre is part of the Crisis Centre's Emergency Planning Department. With regard to missions relating to the provision of information/knowledge and the formulation of opinions on initiatives/projects related to the emergency plan, the centre of expertise acts at the request of the head of the emergency planning department (or designated emergency plan coordinators)
- The centre is headed by a manager appointed by the Crisis Centre and is composed of representatives (seconded) of partners in different fields: operational disciplines (fire service, civil protection, defence, FPS public health, police), CBRN knowledge centres and training centres
- Collaboration with partners linked to the centre is based on the win win-win principle. The expertise provided by the partners contributes to the development of a updated emergency planning and multidisciplinary CBRN crisis management. Partners bring their knowledge and expertise gained through their own operations and, in return, are supported by the centre of expertise during their own operations.

- Cooperation agreements are concluded accordingly between the National Crisis Centre and the Centre's partners, which describe in particular the contribution and role of the partner in the operation of the Centre and the contribution made by the Centre to the partners' operations.
- The missions of the centre of expertise are carried out by the representatives (seconded) of the centre or, by extension, via the operational services/knowledge centres/training centres they represent, or within the framework of international cooperation (cooperation between operational experts/knowledge centres/training centres). The operational services, Belgian training and knowledge centres act as a structural basis for cooperation with counterpart structures abroad.
- Operations of the centre of expertise are controlled by a steering committee composed of the heads of the participating partners in the centre of expertise, chaired by the Director-General or the head of the Emergency Planning department. The steering committee oversees the multidisciplinary operation of the centre and the respect of agreements between the centre and individual partners.
- The CBRN Centre of Expertise is fully supported by the Minister of Security and Interior and the entire federal government. The role of the centre has been included as such in the national multidisciplinary emergency plans (nuclear and radiological emergency plan, terror CBRN emergency plan), plans drawn up by Royal Decree. The Minister of the Interior is thus regularly informed of developments relating to the creation of the centre and its work, in particular the results of the meetings of the steering committee.

- *Italy*

The framework governing CBRN response in Italy

“The Italian CBRN crises and emergencies management system is framed within two mechanisms that are formally separated although intrinsically integrated: the Civil defence and the Civil protection...”³

The Civil Defence system

By Civil Defence, is intended the complex of actions that the State undertakes to ensure its own survival and continuity and, in particular, to face events of an anomalous size, through the use of all civilian resources. For the purposes of Civil Defence, all situations that at the national or international level may put the interests of the Nation or security at risk are considered relevant. The Civil Defence system must guarantee the continuity of the Government, the security of the State, the protection of the population, the social survivability and economic productivity of the nation.

Therefore, the Civil Defence concerns the security of the State in the context of national defence as a mean of safeguarding and strengthening the productive and logistic economic survival capabilities of the nation, as well as civil-military cooperation.

The Civil Defence system includes national decision and coordination bodies. In particular, the decision-making bodies are: a) the President of the Council of Ministers; b) the Council of Ministers; c) the Strategic Political Committee. The Situation and Planning Inter-ministerial Cell and the Inter-ministerial Technical Commission of Civil Defence are the bodies in charge of coordination.

According to the provisions of art. 14 of the legislative decree 300/199, the competence in matters of Civil Defence is attributed to the Ministry of Interior and, specifically, to the

³ The Mapping Report of the EU project CBRN Integrated Response Italy EU. Available at: http://cbrn.santannapisa.it/?page_id=92

Department of Fire Brigades, of the Public Relief and Civil Defence, in which the Directorate General of Civil Defence operates. At the local level, the Prefect is entrusted with the coordination of services relating to the Civil Defence sector.



The Crisis Unit is a fundamental body convened by the Minister of Interior when events involving different aspects of security emerge, in order to ascertain and qualify information and to prepare appropriate emergency measures.

National interests falling in the Civil Defence domain can be jeopardized also through the perpetration of terrorist attacks, which can be distinguished in conventional or unconventional attacks involving the use of biological, chemical or radiological/nuclear substances. In this last hypothesis, the planning elaborated by the Fire, Public Rescue and Civil Defence Department will be applied. The planning follows the guidelines for the management of terrorist events adopted by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers in 2005 and the implementation is carried out by the Department of Public Security.

Source: CBRN Integrated Response Italy, Mapping Report, Bonfanti, Capone, Patuasso, 2014.

The Civil Protection System

Civil Defence must not be confused with Civil Protection, since the areas of intervention are different. The Civil Protection concerns the protection of the territory, the relief and assistance of the territory, as well as the protection and recovery from natural disasters or anthropogenic negligence.

The Italian Civil Defence and Civil Protection systems are not only distinct concept but also refer to different bodies and institutions.

The Civil Protection System is made of central and peripheral bodies that carry out a series of actions aimed at safeguarding the territory, aiding and assisting the territory, as well as protecting and recovering property in case of natural disasters.

The current Civil Protection system is based at the Department of Civil Protection (established by Decree of the President of Council Ministers of 22 June 1982), placed within the Presidency of the Council of Ministers which also coordinates it.

The Law 255/1992 established the "National Service of Civil Protection", which introduced significant changes in the previous existing system, with the provision that the Service acts to protect the integrity of life, of property, of settlements, the environment from damage or the danger of damage resulting from natural disasters and catastrophes. The Service is composed by representatives of the central and peripheral State Administrations, of the Regions, of the Provinces, of the Municipalities, of the Public Institutions, national and territorial, and of any other institution, public or private, whose action refers to the civil protection sector.

In order to better cope with emergency situations stemming natural disasters, there are additional central bodies (National Council for Civil Protection, National Commission for Prevention and Prediction of Major Risks, Civil Protection Operating Committee) and peripheral one (Regions, Provinces and Mayors), also including the participation of voluntary associations.

At the local level, in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity, the first person in charge of the civil protection sector is the Mayor of the Municipality affected by the emergency event. In case of inadequacy of the municipal structure to cope with the emergency situation, the provincial and regional levels are immediately activated and, in the most serious situations, also the national one, integrating the forces on the spot with the personnel and means needed.

The presence of a plurality of organisms and actors, whose action tends to face the emergency situation, poses a problem of coordination. In the event of a national emergency, the technical responsibility for the interventions lies with the Civil Protection Department, while the political responsibility lies with the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

With regards to the organizational aspects, it should be noted that in 2005 the "Italy situation room" was activated at the Department of Civil Protection, which operates both on an ordinary and emergency basis. It is a national coordination center that collects, verifies and disseminates civil protection information. Its task is to identify emergency situations and immediately alert the various components and operating structures of the National Civil Protection Service that contribute to emergency management. It is constantly connected with the regions and the prefectures, and with the operators of the communication structures - eg. telecommunications companies, first aid centers, highways, railways - with the aim of collecting and disseminating, in real time, news on emergency situations and ongoing interventions, at national and local level.

The civil protection system does not operate only ex post, but also ex ante, by putting in place any measures to prevent and forecast dangerous events.

Also, in this sector there is a double level of planning, that is a national planning, prepared by the central bodies, followed by the local or descending one, elaborated by the bodies in the national territory. It is evident that the features of planning related to the civil protection sector differ remarkably from those relating to security and Civil Defence.

The difficulty of coordination between different existing systems

The existence of a plurality of systems, each of which is responsible for a specific sector, can sometimes cause problems of coordination, especially from the operations management point of view.

The problem of coordination does not emerge with respect to the Civil Protection sector, as this is a matter managed by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the relevant Department of Protection Civil.

On the other hand, with regard to the Security and Civil Defence sector, the occurrence of events can determine the applicability of the various existing plans.

In consideration of the homogeneity of the interests that emerge, the problem of the technical and operational coordination could be solved through the issuing of a single document that standardizes the provincial and regional plans, in order to obtain a greater synergy of the components of security, Civil Defence and Civil Protection involved in the emergency.

CBRN security in Italy

In Italy, the CBRN framework is regulated only at national central level by laws, decrees, and directives. The operability of the First Responders (Fire Brigades - Health Urgent Rescue - Law Enforcing) is regulated by Standard Operation Procedures specific of each Organization. The cooperation in operations is usual and, when necessary, coordinated at local level by the Prefects. Besides, in Italy, the part “E” - Explosives (which is also included in the EU CBRN Action Plan as part of the CBRN issue), in a terrorist scenario is considered the prerogative of the Law Enforcement. From the point of view of Civil Defence, Italy does not consider Toxic Industrial incidents or a Nuclear Power Plant release as part of the CBRN matter. These two scenarios are considered emergency situations and a Civil Protection issue. State organizes and implements civilian and military capabilities to cope with the multiple risks and threats that may affect the Country (a “crisis situation”) in a Civil Defence environment.

The difference between an emergency and a crisis situation, which corresponds to the distinction between crisis management and emergency management, is not only theoretical since the actors involved are different.

A “crisis situation” refers to any situation likely to involve or only endanger the interests of the Nation, which may originate from the perception of a potential danger or linked to the occurrence of a severely significant events (Decree of the President of Council of Ministers). In other words, the crisis situation is generated by the occurrence of events of any nature that endangers the continuity of the State. Therefore, it contains interests that are essentially referred to the Civil Defence sector, with the consequent activation of the appropriate organizational structure.

The regulation concerning the management of these situations is contained in the "Handbook for the Management of the Crisis", which outlines the national organization for the management of crisis situations.

This handbook is contemplated by the Decree of the President of Council of Ministers of May 5, 2010, through which the national organizational structure (dating back to 1994) concerning the management of crisis situations was partially revisited, included the adaptation of the concept of crisis situation to the changed socio-political scenario.

Relevance of eNOTICE objectives to Italian national policy

As mentioned, at a National level, the presence of a plurality of organisms and actors, whose action tends to face the emergency and crisis situations, determines the need to test the dynamics between the various bodies involved.

On the other hand, this need is relevant also at the EU level, since Italy participates to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and takes part to EU multinational multiagency exercises such as CREMEX and CURIEX, and, as Member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Italy receives inspections of chemicals production and stockpiling sites. Finally, the Italian defence is an active member of the European Defence Agency.

From this point of view, eNOTICE represents an opportunity to get access to a greater number of training activities, during the year, and to practice in a multinational environment, allowing practitioners, industry and policy makers.


Besides, the joint activities of the project and the policy meeting, as Italy as well as other Member states are still defining their CBRN policy framework, can represent a great opportunity to align them in a bottom-up process.

- *France*

In France, the management of CBRN incidents are under the responsibility of the SGDSN (The General Secretariat of Defence and National Security (SGDSN)). It's mandated by the Prime Minister to implement and test government plans. It targets to assess State's capacity to face concretely risks and threats, including terrorism, to which it is confronted: threats in the nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical (CBRN), coming through various aerial, maritime energy cybernetics, etc. means.

Each ministry concerned by CBRN risks defines the measures and actions of its own departments in the territory. The whole is coordinated by the prefectural authority.

GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT-LED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT



As soon as the nature of an incident⁴ is identified, the plan is activated according to its specificity: Biotox for the biological threat, Piratox for the chemical threat, or Piratome for the nuclear and radiological threat.

Victim assistance, infrastructure rehabilitation and environmental impact management are initially managed by first responders (SDIS, BSPP, BMPM, SAMU, security forces...)

The diversity and complexity of the threats, as well as their transnational nature, imply a strong cooperation with all the concerned ministries as well as with institutional and European partners. Three major exercises are organized each year. Lessons from major exercises and real crises are used to:

- improve interregional procedures (e.g. adapt plans, guidelines and organizations)

⁴ NATO defined “CBRN incident” as “An occurrence due to the suspected or confirmed presence of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear substances, either arising from the intention to use them by an aggressor, or following their intentional or accidental release.” (NATOTerm TTF: 2013-0189)

- increase the responsiveness and effectiveness of crisis management agencies (e. g. legislative and regulatory changes; evolutions of organizations, doctrines, capacities.)
- improve collectively the "feedback" (lessons learned from crises and exercises)

The SGDSN regularly updates government plans, including to take in consideration the evolution of risks and such as: the fight against the use of civil air drones for malicious purposes; strengthening the security of sensitive industrial sites against malevolence; the safety of people in the different modes of transport, especially in the public spaces of major railway stations, terminals and interconnections.

The CBRN concept is regulated at national level by various laws, decrees, and directives. The state organizes and implements civilian and military capabilities to cope with the multiple risks and threats that may affect the country. The general interdepartmental contract (in French: CGI) meets this requirement by setting, for the next five years (2015-2019), the critical capacities of the civil ministries and the level of their engagement in the response to major crises. These capabilities are set in a framework of fair sufficiency and complementarity with the other actors of the crisis management that are the armies, the local authorities and the operators of vital importance. It includes a general part and two sections dedicated to the security of information systems and the response to CBRN threats.

Policy	eNOTICE Contribution
The state organizes and implements civilian and military capabilities to cope with the multiple risks and threats that may affect the country.	The enhancement of CBRN training capacity of the eNOTICE training centres is directly linked with the concept with multi and variable threats.
The national capabilities are set in a framework of complementarity with the armies, the local authorities and the operators of vital importance	The eNOTICE exercises are designed with multiple actors (civilian and military forces), stakeholders (involvement of Critical infrastructure concept) and at different level (both regional and national)
Strengthening protection policies against major threats and risks on transport security (maritime, port, air, train etc...)	The eNOTICE community could provide relevant information on user requirements on that topic
The state continues to strengthen the Security of critical infrastructures policy. It aims to broaden their design to an "all-hazards" approach, including business continuity planning against a wide range of risks.	The improvement of the scenario design that has been developed during the eNOTICE activities can have a major impact on this topic
Strengthening the resilience and continuity of the Nation's core business	This objective can be partly taken into account by the eNOTICE network of training centres. eNOTICE stakeholders should involve business continuity in the heart of exercise scenario.

The State has a strong willingness to strengthen the security of Information systems in close collaboration with competent authorities, experts and stakeholders in this domain	By involvement of its comprehensive community, eNOTICE partnership is able to provide key solutions in terms of exercises in this domain.
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<http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/uploads/2018/02/plan-national-nucleaire-fevrier2014-anglais.pdf>
<http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/missions/preparer-la-reponse-aux-crises/>

1.3 CIVIL-MILITARY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CBRN FIELD

The ambition of eNOTICE network of CBRN training centres is to build on civil-military cooperation to overcome the issue of fragmented effort in risks and threats analysis and small market for CBRN-related projects; preceding projects and/or currently procured systems are usually built around the notion of vertical (rather than horizontal) integration which significantly decreases the perspective of procuring new systems, and contributes to a general lack of uptake of R&D results. The ambition is therefore to include cross-sectoral functions and envisage the standardization of developments and ‘interoperability by design’ to propose common interoperable solutions. Embedding research into a wider capability development process can also contribute to better streamlining the common needs of EU security practitioners and to developing innovative solutions which not only are interoperable by design, but which are also triggered by policy priorities, respond to critical and urgent operational needs, and show an adequate balance between cost and effectiveness. EU-tailored integrative operational civil-military capacity with new technologies and tools which connectable and interoperable, hence can be deployed case of major cross-border public health and CBRN crises in Europe and beyond. In that respect, eNOTICE fully supports EU policies (CBRN action plan, enhanced civil-military cooperation, strengthening of European projectable capacities encouraged by the European Commission (e.g. DG HOME, DG ECHO, DG DEVCO, DG SANTE).

The civilian-military cooperation is a way to ensure that research will be taken up by different entities in the EU, NATO and so on, and to try to see what kind of efficient coordination mechanism could be established. The new work programme 2021 – 2027 is not yet finalised, so there is space to improve the civil-military cooperation, to improve the research programme to bring these two sides together. The opportunity to bring them together should not be missed, to avoid the situation when these two research programmes (civilian and military) will run in parallel.

Civil-military cooperation in CBRN field is of paramount importance, however the eNOTICE experience with collection of opinions of multiple stakeholders shows that the overarching concept defining the nature and conditions of this cooperation is currently lacking.

To understand the current obstacles raising questions and preventing civilian and military actors from always working together, we should first look into the definitions to go deeper in the notion of this cooperation from the points of view of military and civilian actors.

According to the NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.19 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation [3] civil-military cooperation is defined as “[...] *a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.*”

The aim of civil-military cooperation (referred to as CIMIC in the military context) is to support the mission objectives by establishing and maintaining cooperation with non-military actors within the area of operations [3]. Ideally all actors will work to a common goal, but where this is not possible this interaction will ensure that activities to support each plan are harmonized as far as possible to avoid negative impacts on own operations as well as on non-military operations and the civil environment. This will minimize interference or unintended conflict between all actors. From the military (NATO) perspective, civil-military cooperation is applicable to all types of NATO operations. Under the concept of comprehensive approach, NATO has instituted broader coordination with non-military actors. Therefore, NATO liaison includes military-military as well as civil-military interactions, with civil-military cooperation focusing on the latter. Commanders are required to assess and analyse the civil environment and apply the cross-cutting topics perspectives in all scenarios when planning and conducting military operations. These considerations include the appreciation of large numbers of non-military actors present in the area of operations. The application and profile of civil-military cooperation depends on the type of operation, the civil environment, and the relationship with non-military actors.

“CIMIC” should not be confused with “Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)”. NATO policy defines CMI as: *‘a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, thereby mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises’*. CMI is the primary means for military forces to both expand their knowledge networks and develop shared situational understanding of the civil environment with other relevant actors in the joint operations area. CMI enables the necessary engagement and coordination process required to create, build and maintain relationships between relevant non-military and military actors. For details please see AJP-3.19 [3]. CIMIC has to be considered as the facilitator of civil-military interaction (CMI).

The level of interaction foreseen between military and civilian actors are described in [3], pointing out that relationships between military and non-military actors cannot be equated to military command authorities (for example, operational control) but instead may be defined by a specified level of interaction. There is no common agreement on these terms, and other stakeholders may use them interchangeably or with different definitions. However, these descriptions are provided as a baseline for common understanding. Depending on the type of interaction, certain responsibilities will be expected by the counterpart. The levels of interaction range from cooperation to coexistence.

a. Cooperation. This can be described as the process of acting together for mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association between actors. Cooperation is a concept of interaction in which planning and activities are carried out jointly and/or in support of each other. Cooperation with other actors does not mean giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.

b. Coordination. This can be described as the process of bringing together different elements of a complex activity or organization into an efficient relationship. Clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction among the participants. Coordination activities include exchanging information, agreeing on joint policies and actions and harmonizing individual activities.

c. De-confliction. This can be described as the process of avoiding undesirable interference among actors, especially where they perform the same function or occupy the same physical space.

d. Consultation. It can be described as seeking the opinion or advice of other actors, which may include discussion.

e. Coexistence. The state or condition of existing at the same time or in the same place. This will generally mean that two or more actors will be aware of each other's presence but will not directly interact.

One of the CIMIC components is Training, education, exercises, experimentation, conduct and general awareness. The training aspects of the CIMIC capability covers, but is not limited to, courses, presentations, conferences and seminars as well as the lessons learned process. The doctrine underlines the full integration of CIMIC in NATO exercises and experiments, therefore rooting it into operational conduct as most important.

This Allied joint publication [3] focuses on CIMIC only in the context of utilizing CIMIC as a means to achieve military objectives. Indeed, in theory, the military can become involved during any CBRN incident and for successfully meeting their objectives they will have to cooperate with non-military actors. However, [6] underlines that in a peacetime situation the military would be purely in support of civil authorities and only for a short period of time, to prevent dependency on military forces.

During CIMIC, the successful interaction is dependent upon integrity, respect, relationships and planning. This can be reflected within information sharing, which is dependent upon the ability to share and the willingness to share.

To be efficient, CIMIC shall be used in a very integrative way in joint multidisciplinary, multinational operations. Within the context of counteracting and/or mitigating biological and chemical threats, CIMIC is of vital importance not only because the frequency with which this type of threats are likely to increase in the upcoming years, but because the civilian and military sectors can often share information and/or operating procedures with one-another that allow both sides to improve their efficiency. Incidents such as the Salisbury Novichok poisoning provide an illustrative example of the challenges associated with the management, recovering from and/or decontaminating the scenes of such incidents and mutual benefits of the CIMIC. The CBRN stakeholders believe that CIMIC is the best way to provide benefits to affected stakeholders during crisis with cross-border impact through procurement of advanced equipment, knowledge sharing, operating procedures and best practices between both sectors.

The NATO Non-Binding Guidelines for enhanced civil-military cooperation to deal with the consequences of large-scale CBRN events associated with terrorist attacks, [5] underline CIMIC as mandatory, stating that:

“Civilian emergency managers (for clarity, the term “Civilian Emergency managers” refers to individuals that are involved in planning for and response a CBRN incident at every level should gain an understanding of military resources, their capabilities and limitations and how to access and integrate them into their respective response operations. With this understanding, civilian emergency managers are better able to save lives, reduce human suffering and mitigate significant property and/or environmental damage.

Civilian emergency managers and first responders (The term ‘First responders’ refers to on-scene personnel from the fire brigades, police and medical services acting to minimize the consequences of a CBRN incident) at the local, regional and national levels should understand roles and authorities pertaining to military support of civil authorities and should build relationships with military authorities within their communities prior to any events. At the same time, military leaders should understand the civilian incident management process. Such preparation will result in a smoother integration of military resources in support of civilian response efforts when they are needed.

Military authorities should evaluate requests received from civilian authorities for:

- Readiness (impact on the military's ability to perform its primary mission: war fighting);
- Cost (including the source of funding); and
- Legality (compliance with relevant laws, plans, and procedures).

Many of these issues can be planned in advance with pre-scripted mission assignments to facilitate a more rapid coordination process. Based on the planning scenarios and taking into account the actual deployment time of the military forces, these assignments may specify the type of assistance that is required, a statement of work and a projected cost and source of funding. Examples, but not exhaustive, include:

- Transportation (e.g., rotary wing lift, heavy ground transportation for first responders, emergency route clearance, including quickly clearing roads or establishing temporary bridges);
- Medical (e.g., extraction units and patient evacuation, medical personnel, field hospitals and mortuary services);
- On site response (e.g. hazardous material sampling; handling, analysis, and transportation of contaminated CBRN material; decontamination; containment and population protection measures; urban search & rescue and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) (ref NATOTerm TTF: 2009-0103), units able to cross or to reach heavily contaminated areas, even by gamma radiations, using special vehicles);
- Energy (e.g., fuel distribution points and generators);
- Communications support to first responders;
- Aerial imagery; and
- Mutual aid support agreements, including international assistance.

Military authorities can serve in a supporting role to civilian emergency managers.

Success is based on civilian emergency managers building and maintaining relationships and the resulting capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major incidents. The ability of the emergency management community to achieve and sustain these capabilities requires engaging in capabilities-based planning to achieve target levels of capability. Ideally, military and civilian organizations should plan, train, and exercise together.

Training and exercises context

Due the low frequency of CBRN incidents and competition for scarce resources, time and funding for training and exercising of CBRN response is often limited. In addition, the artificial nature of training/exercise environments do not reflect the true impact that a CBRN incident will have on a community with respect to the potential large number of victims, witnesses, or suspects, and the interoperability requirements between response organizations.

Comprehensive training and exercises involving all the relevant stakeholders in CBRN response is the key to developing and maintaining efficient and coordinated CBRN incident management. Specific training in civil-military cooperation and interoperability, combined with regular exercise, is necessary to ensure sufficient knowledge of capabilities.

A national CBRN defence training and exercise curriculum within the general civil emergency readiness training program is recommended in order to achieve balanced cross-sectoral and multidisciplinary CBRN readiness. National efforts should be supported by NATO and relevant international organizations' training guidance and exercise possibilities.

Guidelines

- Civil and military authorities should train and exercise together in order to better respond to CBRN incidents.

- Comprehensive national preparedness training and exercise curriculum should emphasize first responder interoperability and coordination with the military in different CBRN threat and hazard scenarios in order to support sector-specific training programs.
- Nations should provide first responders with training on how to recognize the signs and symptoms caused by CBRN substances (including the basic characteristics and consequences of a specific substance – for example, noticing the need for self-protection). In addition, first responders should receive specific training to prepare them for the shocking effects of the unusual levels of violence associated with many terrorist attacks. The military could support such training.
- Nations should consider developing virtual reality or technically supported simulation support to joint exercises to increase the level of participation, decrease cost, and improve response coordination among all parties involved. In addition, national CBRN training and exercises could be broadened to include media (also social media/public information aspects) as well as support to victims' families and the general public in the affected area.
- First responders should be provided with an appropriate level of training in responding to CBRN incidents, not limited to only recognizing such incidents, as they are typically first on scene until escalated to response at a national level or by military authorities.
- Common civil-military training should include the use of live agents, if available, to increase confidence in working in CBRN environments.

In the cross-border cooperation between civilian and military actors of different nations, what needs to be worked on can be divided into two different branches: relationship-building and exercising [6].

Relationship-building

Relationships between different actors need to be pre-established before any incident occurs.

Trust: This includes the relationship between civil and military authorities, during relationship building, trust is a component that is a beneficial side-effect. It decreases friction between different actors and does reduce the threshold of a willingness to share knowledge, information and capabilities.

Legal: Moreover, relationships can be manifested in a legal framework. The legal framework may support the development of relationships. It enables for actors to have a guideline, which will reassure the actors.

Multinational Civil-Military Cooperation: Good relations beyond borders of course and between civilian and military actors, is based upon relationships.

Exercises

To evaluate and reinforce the relationships, exercises are an invaluable tool. Within these recommendations reinforcing relationships and evaluating is their primary benefit.

Capabilities: They can help to test capabilities, but also identify capabilities, which may be available to civilian or military actors and not to the other one yet. Additionally, capabilities can be tested in this manner and identify possibly lacks in opportunities.

Procedures: The identified problem is that there are existent procedures; however, those have arguably never been tested. CBRN response has been included into different exercises, but there is no recent example of a large-scale exercise or incident, with a dominant component of a CBRN response, which would require an international response. Therefore, the procedures in place are highly theoretical and an exercise can evaluate and identify potential shortcomings.

Multinational Civil-Military cooperation: Finally, exercises ensure that there is a real interaction, between civil and military actors, including multiple agencies, with their different capabilities, qualities. This has the potential to reinforce the testing of capabilities and procedures. Moreover, differences, strengths and weaknesses of the different agencies can be uncovered by those exercises.

A number of advantages and challenges in civil-military and cross-border cooperation were identified at the 13th meeting of the CoU and by representatives of the eNOTICE training centres and external participants at Joint Activities in Gurcy, France (May 2019) and Birmingham, GBR (July 2019). Similar concerns related to the improvement of mechanisms of civil-military cooperation, cooperation between actors at the national and international levels, and harmonisation of training were expressed:

- Civil-military cooperation is necessary from point of view of CBRN stakeholders. In CBRN civil-military cooperation in response and aftermath depends on national regulations. The advantage is we can learn from both sides, learn each other's capabilities, procedures. The challenge is that time is needed to achieve efficient cooperation in training, information exchange, courses, etc.
- There is no common EU doctrine for civil-military cooperation. The efforts are fragmented and have been split into hundreds of projects, there is no common strategy.
- An example of existing national doctrine for multi-agency response inside the country is the UK JESIP (Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles) <https://www.jesip.org.uk/home> [4] The 'Joint Doctrine' provides commanders, at the scene and elsewhere, with generic guidance on the actions they should take when responding to multiagency incidents of any scale. It is built on common principles for consistent terminology and ways of working. It does not constitute a set of rules to be applied without thought, but rather seeks to inform, explain and guide, to be embedded in individual organisation policies and procedures and in their training and exercise programmes, for all levels of response staff. [4]
- Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is a good example of cross-border cooperation at NATO level. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_117757.htm
- Civil-military cooperation is often neglected by various actors – both at EU and at national levels. Stakeholders of all kinds lose a lot from lack of cooperation. Synergies are important for all – sharing practices, training, R&D
- Challenge – sharing of confidential or classified information. [*Comment of the author: It is worth noting here that even the military side recognizes it, NATO doctrine calls to refrain from too much classifying, declassify as much as possible for efficient civil-military interaction.*]
- Other challenges lie in the spheres of communication, allocation of resources and responsibilities.
- Cultural differences and language (both natural language barriers and professional terminology differences) can be challenges as well. Alignment of terminology for precise common understanding of all terms and concepts is a must for interoperable communications and coherent multi-agency working. The first JCBRND COE Advisors Conference identified the need to develop a common civil-military CBRN response terminology.
- Constitutional and legal frameworks in EU Member States are different regarding civil-military responsibilities in case of incidents, especially in cross-border operation.
- There are significant differences in the expertise in CBRN field, in procedures, in command and control structure. It is difficult to compare civil and military capabilities in CBRN due to difference of operational requirements. There is a concern that in case of

a common response, military actors will primarily focus on CBRN, while civilian actors will focus on civil protection. Overall militaries are considered to have stronger competence and more resources, however, at the same time it was pointed out that such structures as civil protection and military police can be often compatible with militaries, because civil protection reacts really fast to incidents, works closely with fire brigades, police, medical teams, that gives good advantage on cooperative response; and training of military police is very similar to military training. Thus, there are some common points in cooperation, to start with.

- When we speak about training - it is difficult to compare procedures and courses provided by civil and military organisations, including mobile courses, because there are no standards for the courses, and usually it is not known who provides what courses. A way out would be systematic description of the courses, mapping and scheduling them and sharing this information, to know exactly what courses are available where.
- Cross-border trainings are essential to know and comply with the procedures and standards of neighbours.
- Standards – military actors tend to operate based on standards of NATO, National authorities, - integration and acceptability can be easier. Civil security standards are not so well integrated at EU level, e.g. multiple common operational pictures, so it is more difficult in civilian sector. The lack of standardized procedures that everyone could use hampers the process as well. Common procedures, common integrated training environment is necessary.

A number of solutions were proposed that can foster the civil-military cooperation:

- The Non-binding guidelines for enhanced civ-mil cooperation to deal with consequences of large-scale CBRN events associated with terrorist attacks in conjunction with the Cross-border cooperation in case of CBRN incidents document [5] might improve civil-military cooperation, e.g. in the area of standardized legal framework;
- For efficient cooperation the right bodies must be identified at all levels;
- Use of military capacities in operations led by civilian actors;
- Combining military and civilian knowledge and competence to improve risk assessment, CBRN incident response and SOPs
- Improve civil-military cooperation by conducting common training and exercises
- Joint civ-mil scientific and technological research, development and innovation, with alignment of civ and mil research programmes and funding mechanisms to avoid duplication of efforts and conflict of interest
- Reach out to EU partner countries (e.g. Lebanon, other Middle East, African, Asian countries) to improve their civ-mil capabilities and capacities mitigating incidents and disasters Combine EU needs with NATO military capabilities likewise it is planned to support DG DEVCO request to strengthening Morocco's CBRN first responders by sending a mobile training team from NATO's CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence.
- Coordinate CBRN related mobile training solutions. Up to now there is no coordinated overview on the various national or international mobile training solutions. This might be an additional topic to be considered by eNOTICE project.
- Harmonised training is supposed to be economically beneficial and money saving. It has to be based on commonly accepted standards. It is necessary to continue to harmonize EU- and NATO CBRN-training efforts. On the military side there is already some coordination and cooperation in place. The JCBRN Defence Centre of Excellence - a partner in eNOTICE - which is already the NATO discipline leader for CBRN Training and Education might also become the discipline leader for EU military CBRN training.

- Common exercises are needed with variety of scenarios, with harmonisation of procedures, contact the appropriate bodies (CEN-CENELEC, ISO, NATO...) Political will is needed as well to push forward joint actions, trainings, cooperation between actors at all levels.
- Furthermore, given the differences in legal frameworks and national approaches, the processes of civil-military cooperation require further alignment in cross-border cooperation. In addition, cooperation on the national level can be improved by enhancing communication between different actors (e.g. relevant ministries). The platform that the Belgium Federal Crisis Centre seeks to develop serves as an illustration of a strategy to enhance communication and information exchange.
- Finally, training courses on coordination are welcomed by actors in the civil-military domain. During the 13th CoU meeting the need for practical courses instead of theoretical ones was expressed; practitioners would benefit from having more guidance in operational aspects. In addition, more novel approaches to training courses can be considered following the initiative of mobile courses provided by the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence.

Following the publication of the “Non-binding guidelines for enhanced civ-mil cooperation to deal with consequences of large-scale CBRN events associated with terrorist attacks” JCBRND COE conducted its first JCBRND COE Advisors Conference in Prague (Czech Republic) from 17th to 19th September 2019. The conference developed a couple of recommendations on how to implement the non-binding guidelines. Some recommendations relevant for NATO – EU cooperation:

- Intensify NATO – EU cooperation in the area of CBRN Defence related civil-military cooperation in accordance with 2018 NATO – EU Declaration.
- Developing civil-military terminology on civil-military cooperation
- To investigate options stockpiling CBRN Defence equipment for NATO’s and EU’s operations and population improving the mitigation of large scale CBRN incidents as one Lessons Learned from the Salisbury event
- To consider a mechanism to delineate responsibility between NATO and EU in support of a response on large-scale CBRN incidents.

Many of the findings have been confirmed during the eNOTICE second Policy Meeting that took place at the Joint Activity in Dortmund on September 20, 2019. The next section provides a detailed report of this meetings results.

2 REPORT FROM THE SECOND POLICY MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 20, 2019

2.1 CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SECOND POLICY MEETING

The second Policy Meeting took place on September 20 from 14.00 to 16.00 in the training centre of the Fire Department of Dortmund, the day before the large multidisciplinary CBRN exercise. All the policy makers participating in the meeting were invited to the exercise where they could witness the logic and spirit of the eNOTICE Joint Activities, meet the eNOTICE consortium representatives define priorities for the policy related to CBRN TCs, expectations from the eNOTICE network of CBRN TCs, and desired ways of interaction with the network.

After the first Policy Meeting in June 2018, where the discussion was held with the representatives of DG HOME, DG ECHO, DG DEVCO on the CBRN policy issues from the European Commission point of view, this second Policy Meetings aimed at collecting the views of national, in this case German stakeholders. The second Policy Meeting aimed at discussion the policy issues with the German representatives at local, regional and federal levels, to gauge

the interest of German training centres in the network, to discuss the expectations, the potential impact on the national CBRN action plan and policy in general.

2.2 SPEAKERS AND TOPICS ON THE AGENDA

Ten representatives of German national, regional and local authorities, both civilian and military were the panel speakers at the second Policy Meeting. Brief profiles of the panellists were collected in advance before the meeting, to understand how to better adapt the questions and direct the discussion in the most appropriate way. The panellists were:

1. **Henry Günter Neumann**, Dipl.-Inform, Colonel (ret)

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - former organisation: all levels plus multinational levels like NATO and EU; current organisation: dito

Area of organisation (civilian, military) – military, responsible for the entire CBRN Defence in the Bundeswehr CBRN DefCom

Function within organisation - former commander Bundeswehr CBRN Defence Command, now CEO of a small consultancy office

Area of duty within the organisation - responsible for the entire CBRN Defence in the Bundeswehr

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - Training was part of the responsibility, the CBRN School belongs to the Bundeswehr CBRN Defence Command

2. **Dr. Roman Trebbe**

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance; Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defence

Area of organisation (civilian, military) - Civilian

Function within organisation - Head of Division IV.4 (Science, Technology and Public Health) at the AKNZ (Akademie für Krisenmanagement, Notfallplanung und Zivilschutz - Academy for Crisis Management, Emergency Planning and Civil Defence)

Area of duty within the organisation - The division is responsible for the planning and implementation of courses for the training of specialists and multipliers (train-the-trainer), i.a. in the subject of CBRN in the context of civil defence (§§ 11 and 14 ZSKG)

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - Creation of specifications with regards to type, number and content of the courses. Advising the department management and the President of the BBK (Das Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe - Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance) on necessary measures in context with CBRN training. Close cooperation with the specialist department CBRN in the BBK to transfer scientific/technical aspects into the training.

3. **Dirk Veeck**

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - German Bundeswehr

Area of organisation (civilian, military) - Military CBRN & Fire Fighter Training

Function within organisation - Director Training Management

Area of duty within the organisation - Training Management

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - Entire Bundeswehr CBRN training

4. **Josef Schun**

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - Fire Department Saarbrücken (local); Department for Disaster Management (regional)

Area of organisation (civilian, military) - Civilian

Function within organisation - Chief of Department

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - Responsible for all CBRN operations of the Department; Responsible for regional disaster management when CBRN situations occur within the region of Saarbrücken; Decision about the choice of CBRN training organisations for the education of the fire departments staff.

5. Roberto Kirstein

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - German Bundeswehr

Area of organisation (civilian, military) - military fire-fighting trainings

Function within organisation - student coy commander

Area of duty within the organisation - execution of fire-fighting trainings

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - entire Bundeswehr fire-fighting trainings

6. Dipl.-Ing. Dirk Aschenbrenner

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - Fire Department of Dortmund, local, regional

Area of organisation (civilian, military) – civilian, emergency medical service, fire-fighting, technical assistance also in CBRN situations, civil protection

Function within organisation - Director of the fire department, chief incident commander

Area of duty within the organisation - department management

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - strategic direction of the department also for CBRN.

7. Dr. Klaus Block

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - Ministerium des Innern des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen

Area of organisation (civilian, military) – civil, Fire Fighting, civil protection

Function within organisation - Referent

Area of duty within the organisation - Creating concepts for standardisation of help from one city to another

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - Guidelines for Analytical Task Force in NRW and working for and with police

8. BD Dr.-Ing. Hauke Speth

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - Fire Department of Dortmund, local, regional

Area of organisation (civilian, military) - civilian, emergency medical service, fire fighting, technical assistance also in CBRN situations, civil protection

Function within organisation - Director of the section "training, education and research", leader of the analytical task force (ATF), incident commander

Area of duty within the organisation - conceptual orientation of the research institute IFR (Institute for Fire and Rescue Technology) and the education and training centre

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - strategic orientation in CBRN response concepts.

9. Eike Hellenkamp

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - Fire Department Hagen, City of Hagen, North Rhine Westphalia, Germany

Area of organisation (civilian, military) - The fire department Hagen is a civil organization

Function within organisation - Head of Department Preventive Security

Area of duty within the organisation - Fire and civil protection

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - Responsible for planning and preparation

10. André Schild

Organisation and administrative level (local, regional, national) - Fire Department City of Essen/Germany, Analytical Task Force (ATF) in Essen/Germany

Function within organisation - firefighter (officer)

Area of duty within the organisation - Responsible for CBRN-Protection and the Analytical Task Force (ATF) in Essen/Germany

Responsibilities and sphere of influence within the CBRN (-training) area - Trainer for the fire department in Essen, Trainer for the ATF, guest lecturer in the CBRN sector in Germany

The discussion was animated by eNOTICE partners:

Wolfgang Reich (JCBRND COE, co-chair of the Policy Meeting, eNOTICE partner)

Olga Vybornova (UCL-CTMA, co-chair of the Policy Meeting, eNOTICE – Coord)

Jean-Luc Gala (UCL-CTMA, eNOTICE – Coord)

After the short welcome and introduction, Olga Vybornova presented the eNOTICE project in a nutshell, its objectives, political context, results achieved so far in the network building and highlighting the German training centres that wished to join the network of CBRN training centres.

All panellists were presented, and they were given the word to speak from their own perspective, given their position and level of authority on the following questions that were addressed to them as the basis for discussion:

Question 1 - General, expectations:

What is the added value for German TCs in participation in pan-EU network of TC? Advantages? Challenges? What are the expectations and requirements of policy makers specifically for Germany? Should there be and if yes how to create or improve the functional and operational interaction between the TC network and the policy level in Germany?

Question 2 - Interest/Impact:

What might be the interest/impact(s) of the network of CBRN training centres on national or on respective level policy in Germany? (if any?)

On national or on respective level CBRN Action Plan?

Question 3 - Civil-military cooperation:

Is there political and legal framework allowing civil-military cooperation?

Joint exercises?

Joint Research & Development & Innovation?

Concrete examples in Germany?

Question 4 - Request? Priority?:

Do you have any expectation or a first request you would like to address to the network of CBRN Training Centres?

After each policy question replied by the panellists the floor was given to two questions from the audience.

2.3 SECOND POLICY MEETING: KEY POINTS AND TAKE HOME MESSAGES

The following section summarises the two-hour discussion at the second Policy Meeting.

<p>What is the added value for German TCs in participation in pan-EU network of TC? Advantages? Challenges?</p> <p>What are the expectations and requirements of policymakers specifically for Germany?</p> <p>Should there be and if yes how to create or improve the functional and operational interaction between the TC network and the policy level in Germany?</p>	
CHALLENGES	ADVANTAGES of network
<p>To be a member of the TC network is a challenge: Time and resource consuming (constraints; personnel necessary to set up the network and keep it alive)</p>	<p>Exchanges of knowledge/ know-how, best practices, procedures and teaching topics and methods (didactic methods) and exchange of information.</p> <p>This might lead to formal or informal common standards in terms of material and procedures</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>the best practices of some actors may be uptaken by others</u> - <u>Platform for exchange of standardized training material</u> (training courses, videos, etc... usable by all). Standard for EU rescue or standard useful for EU initiatives (EU modules) and for CBRN teams intervening abroad - <u>Exchange of lecturers and trainers through the structured TC network might be even more efficient than exchange of trainees – already for costs and language reasons</u> <p>A TC network might also help share the burden of educational and training work: CBRN protection courses require a lot of efforts and professional expertise (need of real specialists) – connecting may help share this burden and preserve resources (money, personnel)</p>
<p>We have to know what is done elsewhere but different geography and climate: what is a relevant hazard in some region is irrelevant for other regions: not all hazards are considered equal in all parts of the EU: limitations when exchanging</p>	<p><u>To be informed on what is proposed by other educational TC – Training, Tactics and Procedures (TTE) - and compare TTE</u> (should it be further developed or it fulfils only own and local purposes); this is a chance to compare what we do with what others do and to improve what should be.</p> <p><u>This is important, as member of the EU, because we need to consider the CBRN training beyond the national perimeter and look at what is necessary at a local but also at a larger scale, i.e. at federal, EU level.</u></p>
<p>Sustainability from MIL point-of-view: Need to keep membership – to have a fixed member - because of staff change every two years. The personnel</p>	

<p>need to be connected and supported not just for one year but on the long run.</p> <p>Network stability: Essential to create a stable network (rotation of the persons in charge): need for central formal administration with executive board: “one central focal point” to administer the network and guarantee TC network sustainability (Who and where does not matter)</p> <p>Solution? Supra-national convention every two years? State contribution after sensibilization of CBRN SAB-NCP.</p> <p>With civil-military cooperation maybe useful to organise the first one within the eNOTICE network?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil-military cooperation exists in EU project so useful to make the link - Approach the national CBRN focal points sitting in the CBRN security Advisory Board (but the German Focal Point is not known by everyone around the table!) - Suggestion National Focal Points connected with the EU-Focal Points? <p>EU should take over and support at the request of the MS if they consider it useful and strategic: EU CBRN Action Plan</p> <p>Suggestion: why not to organise a first conference of this type before the end of eNOTICE?</p>	
<p>TC in CBRN Defence or protection? wording different if you are in the military - CBRN Defence or civil - CBRN Protection (note: even though there is a military Framework Nations Concept (FNC) cluster named CBRN protection); however, militaries are also recently talking about CBRN protection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>Financial constraints</u>: if no funding: difficult to travel to different TC if no financial support. - <u>Legal constraints</u>: is it legal to share – to administer - antidote among first responders from different MS? (Likewise, with rescue measures) - <u>Cross-border issues</u> (difference in TTPs [tactics, techniques, procedures] and language among MS requiring standardized procedures): How to work on the principle of different rules and law when dealing with the personnel from other MS? - <u>Language barrier sometimes even within the same country</u> (Belgium, Germany) – NB the mil officers and NCO usually have language courses - UK becoming more and more the basis / working language - but it is not a common practice among all first civil responders; not everybody is educated in another language). <p>Role of civil-military cooperation? Concept of civil military defence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil firefighters (FF) training with military FF? - Training with military CBRN specialists - Who is doing what – practical terms? 	<p>CBRN threats can be underestimated: attack occurs seldom. However, if it occurs, we need to be prepared because it will have a major impact on our activities. The issue is always to balance between the likelihood and the outcome.</p> <p>In comparison to daily incidents, it is hard to get the visibility: need to fight for resources and to get the acknowledgment, to catch the attention of the policy-makers.</p> <p><u>It is wise that TC get together (resources pooling) and start networking and joining efforts</u></p> <p><u>Advantage of the TC network:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased interoperability between TC may contribute to achieve interoperability of different FF organizations across the EU (multi-national cooperation). - Network of TC (multinational interoperable structure) can be a way: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) to better manage civil-military cooperation and cross-border issues (b) to increase the visibility of such capabilities and bring them to the attention of the policy-makers (c) to increase the trust and confidence of the population towards Civil Defence / FF organizations (d) to exchange best practice leading to some kind of (formal, informal) standardization (useful for cross-border issues and for identifying gaps in training)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Should civil FF be responsible for first response and militaries may be responsible for large area reconnaissance when such capabilities are lacking in the civ world? - Joint activities in decontamination? <p>In particular, is civil-military cooperation a way to exploit live agents training: need for military but is this needed for civil CBRN platoon?</p> <p>It can be an advantage to use the military capacity to train with live agents.</p> <p>So what are the needs? This has to be defined</p>	
<p>Those who participated needs to see a clear benefit.</p> <p>Networking means <u>working</u> and so it requires time and efforts but this kind of efforts can be provided.</p>	<p>Comparison of operational procedures and best practices but we should not only look at “how things <u>are dealt with in the field during an incident and how we prepare for that</u>” but we need to look at teaching methodology also - “how to teach, what to teach and how training is delivered” and compare</p> <p>Major change expected next year: School Education using electronic devices: this should apply also to the TC because the young generation likes new technology as a support of the teaching & learning process. In that respect, there are already differences between TC and public schools (the latter are far ahead).</p> <p>Opportunity to push this new educational method via the network of TC?</p>
<p><u>(End-user point of view):</u> Information about eNOTICE lacking at the national end-user level. High-level project with high-level information connected to the EU is not useful if it is not also connected to for end-users at a lower level (rural areas). The latter need also to benefit from this knowledge.</p> <p>We need to pay major attention to “end-user rescuing specialists”. <u>They play indeed a key role in the network so we need to think how to bring the most useful information to them so that they can select the best TC to get the high-level training</u> (especially if they do not have their own TC, which is the usual situation at the local level)</p> <p>What is very much needed and particularly useful is the information on the best standard for “rescuing people”</p> <p><u>Suggestion:</u> “An eNOTICE application” on a smartphone can be used as easy dissemination tool?</p>	<p>Pending access to appropriate and most useful information, end-users could select the best TC from the network of TC and get the best and highest level of training: It is crucial for small end-users’ capacities which have no access to own TC!</p> <p>In this case, the network offers a real benefit!</p>
<p>Local and National TC need to connect together and define how to teach and what to teach. However, there is no financial resources and human resources to coordinate this at the local level. There is a need of support at the national level.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Currently, there is a lack of resources at the federal and federal state level to coordinate new educational 	

<p>methods at the local level. In that respect, there is a strong association of firefighters.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - This “Association of Firefighters” in Germany could provide useful information on the project in a neutral way and help coordinate the participation to the network. <p>This is an example of national professional networks that eNOTICE needs to get in contact to and establish strong links.</p>	
<p>Needs information from the outside The network is like an “umbilical cord“ for operations, techniques, education and source of information that help them to stay alive while doing their job. The main goals are the same.</p>	<p>Represents a small community but faces the same CBRN issues as large(r) cities. They have the same needs in training and education / teaching of first responders who deserve small communities. TC network may help share useful knowledge and disseminate all useful information at this lower level.</p>

<p>What might be the interest/impact(s) of the network of CBRN training centres on national or on respective level policy in Germany? (if any?) On national or on respective level CBRN Action Plan? Is there political and legal framework allowing civil-military cooperation?</p>	
<p>CHALLENGES</p>	<p>ADVANTAGES</p>
<p>Contacting the German National CBRN Focal Point is not easy because just few people know her.</p> <p>The national challenge: To have a national CBRN plan!</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 2016: Concept of civil defence including a chapter on CBRN related issues. (Konzeption Zivile Verteidigung). Additional document: Conceptual framework for CBRN protection in civil protection (Rahmenkonzeption für den CBRN-Schutz im Bevölkerungsschutz) - Are there training issues mentioned? No, there is no document yet on training concept. - National focus of the plan or linked to the EU? <p>No! Focus purely on national aspects but maybe opportunity to make a link with EU and with NATO (through military support or civil support to host nation - everything is interlinked)</p> <p>Missing currently is the concept of overarching civil military defence (the overarching structure): civil-military cooperation needs to be pushed forward and developed.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civil-military cooperation before: civil organizations supported the militaries organization conducting collective defence in Europe. - Change of civil-military cooperation meaning after 1990 and especially after 2001: civil-military cooperation meant then the support of the civilian side by military organizations (and in many authority heads nowadays in the EU, it is still “support of the civilian side by the military side”). 	

<p>Now we need civil-military cooperation: rethink it/ for collective defence in NATO: mil requires to be supported by the civilian side</p> <p>Civil-military cooperation needs to be considered in both directions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - if we want to prepare a collective defence for the Eastern flank of NATO, we need to have the support of the civil organisations - in a terrorist attack accidental or natural catastrophe: we need the support of the militaries <p>the civ-mil cooperation concept is much broader now</p> <p>Closer cooperation with the EU needed but how to establish this cooperation in practical terms?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Soccer World cup in 2006: plan to respond to a terrorist attack: this was the very first time that one thought about “how the military forces could support the civilian side” especially for decontamination and CBRN detection. <p>Need to focus on reaction / response capacities and to discuss common analytical procedures and use of specific devices in the preparatory / planning phase to improve the response.</p> <p>How to integrate the FF in the EU system for Disaster Response – cf EU modules system - (this has been much discussed in Germany); the idea of national FF service coordinating state FF services and connecting with the EU.</p>	<p>The advantage of the EU system for combatting CBRN disasters is to combine most needed resources and training methods (how to validate training)</p> <p>The idea should indeed be “how to assist each other” and to combine the knowledge and necessary material, looking at the protection response and recovery but also at the prevention</p> <p>Civil-military cooperation is looking at all aspects: prevention, preparedness, response and recovery!</p>
<p>The German military CBRN defence capabilities are developed to support the Armed Forces, and not designed to support State or Federal State level organisations outside the MoD.</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strong CBRN capabilities among FF in Germany - The Armed Forces have supported Fed State and State activities in the past (bird flu, Soccer World Cup, State Level Visits, etc.) on request. However, the civilian side cannot rely on military capabilities. The military system is not designed to be used outside the Armed Forces on a regular basis. <p>German military CBRN Forces have a lot of training and exercises opportunities in Germany and within NATO throughout the year. The challenge is to select the most important ones und to avoid the overstretching of those small CBRN forces. There are many annual and bi-annual exercises in Germany (State and Fed State Level) where civilian and military capability holders work together, define obstacles and exchange experience.</p>	<p>Common civ-mil strength: CBRN Tasks are almost the same for civ and mil so there is an opportunity to learn from each other; moreover, both use almost the same devices: this is an advantage for CBRN and it is applicable all around the world.</p> <p>It gives an opportunity to look at TTP (Tactics, Training and Procedures): how we do things and this is a good opportunity to look at the current situation and to define what kind of training level is needed e.g. for firefighters in the EU (regular and CBRN specialists)</p> <p>NB: Common exercise exists already in Belgium (CP and Defence jointly exercising with their CBRN team for reconnaissance, sampling and for decontamination).</p>
<p>One of the major problems is communication, it is a real issue (different terms in NATO; different communication set up). Therefore, FF and police are not interoperable for C2. (same issue in Belgium, and USA)</p>	

And there is no interoperability in communication for civil and military actors.	
No need to develop dozens of networks but rather to give the priority to personnel and to end-users training	
Focus on equipment (Procurement of equipment) but not always or not sufficiently on training. Procurement of equipment is not sufficiently associated with adequate training.	Educational framework and policy-making in relation to the Federal constitution. The network could help.
Need of personnel for training: policy makers need to invest in people	

Expectations / requests to make our training centres better
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Already said before

- Mil and civ TC
- Training together – common Ex – cross-border
- Putting staff together: Mixed decontamination staff

Same issues for mil and FF in terms of CBRN

TC may facilitate TTP development and “Live agents training”

Is there a need for CBRN Civ platoon to be trained with live agents?

Key question is what are our needs?

CHALLENGES	ADVANTAGES
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<p><u>To define the conditions to find the requested information on training centres</u> which are part of the project already and which may then be invited to get involved: the end-users do not have the time to try to find the information and call every city in Germany to see what exists and where</p> <p>We need more Information on the current project and on TC already active in the project and those invited to play a role in the project: simple and easy to use mechanism to find them!</p>	
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<p><u>We need to define what are the needs</u></p> <p>The incidence of CBRN events is rather low and training & exercises are necessary: the lowest the incidence the harder the training needed.</p> <p>Every city in Germany needs to be prepared to this type of event. <u>There should therefore be more training opportunities and standardization</u></p> <p><u>Training and teaching</u></p> <p><u>Learning basic methods:</u> are they the same for civ and mil? Answer: Mil FF get initially trained through the civ FF (major school) because mil did not have the capability to do on its own.</p> <p>There is a will to keep a close relationship kept on the fed level with mil schools - Personnel already exchanged</p>	<p>Many training opportunities in Germany or also in other countries. Does not matter where you train you should be easy with training!</p> <p>If we do not teach the same way and do not speak the same language, it will be a problem for technical aspects: need for standardized training!</p> <p><u>Not a problem on the technical level for the response team as it always intervenes as a unit.</u></p> <p><u>But useful to have some leadership in training for management</u> and keep it linked with a national approach: to have a place to discuss and avoid some unit be unaware of a national approach (and so keeping a federal overarching structure in teaching) and certainly for “<u>officers in command</u>”</p> <p>Incident management could benefit from this</p> <p>The network should not follow the aim to unify, we need to allow different approaches and respect country sovereignty and coexistence of local organizations:</p>
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common standards (formal and informal) and exchange standardized training. Training is important not only in terms of contents, but also in terms of new methodology of delivering of training to the audience. Civil-military cooperation is recognized as a must for a network of CBRN TC, the concept has to be improved and further developed for enhanced mechanism of the cooperation itself, for practical knowledge and training exchanges between the actors.

- Challenges for the network building, and requests for the network:
 - ✓ personnel resources and time to maintain the network activities. Networking means Working!
 - ✓ lack of financial resources, including budget for travels to trainings abroad,
 - ✓ Align terminologyDue to language issues and costs, exchange of trainers could be even more preferable and more efficient than exchange of big groups of operational staff
 - ✓ Look into legal constraints, and cultural differences, learn what is acceptable and what not in another country
 - ✓ Provide more and better information about the project. Reinforce targeted dissemination at national and local levels
 - ✓ Provide more training opportunities. Standardised training
 - ✓ Network should not unify everything, much better to encompass and play on the differences between TC, but also have central approaches.

Stronger dissemination is needed at the local level, and for national actors, because currently it appears that the higher-level dissemination to projects and EU stakeholders does not reach the local actors who are most interested to have the information. Also, it is a must to get in contact with and establish strong links with national professional networks and groups, such as German Association for firefighters.

Sustainability of the network after the end of eNOTICE project is certainly the priority focus of the project partners effort, and it was confirmed as the crucial question at the policy meeting. One of main issues: we cannot rely on personal contacts; military staff changes every two years. We need to provide a mechanism for solid network creation no matter who is the current contact point in an organization-member. For the network itself the formal central administration is required, one central contact point of the network. An opportunity here is to have a supra-national structure, with local focal points linked to EU CBRN Focal Points.

It was specially discussed and underlined that state organisations should be preferred to private in the network membership. TC-members of the network should be supported by and act on behalf of authorities, not to be purely commercial.

eNOTICE network should capitalize on internationally recognized operational assets and expertise of EU Member States in the field of CBRN and public health crisis, and to create a ‘civil-military operational, multidisciplinary and multinational chain of value’ that can be projectable for major cross-border CBRN crises.

The ambition is to develop a set of new and upgraded tools integrated in the operational workflow of different categories of first responders called to intervene together on the scene in case of major CBRN crises. The experience from previous eNOTICE Joint Activities showed that most of these tools, at their current stage of development do not have appropriate maturity, and/or do not provide a useful solution for first responders. In order not to interfere in the exercise procedures, immature technologies at lower TRL levels can be tested at the side of the general exercise scenario, to obtain the necessary feedback of the practitioners, but not to disturb the work flow of the training.

In the long run all tools and their interfaces must be adapted with first responders, and impose a design compatible with portability, scalability, ‘on-site use’ to be smoothly uptaken in end-users’ legacy.

To maximise the research uptake of technological innovations, ‘generic good practices’ should be identified and compared in collaboration with relevant EU projects for information exchange, brainstorming and tutorials with end-users outside of the consortium. eNOTICE strives to harmonisation, whenever possible considering national sovereignty.

Valorisation of recent past and ongoing EU CBRN R&D projects by integrating lessons learnt as well as selected relevant low TRL deliverables and developed procedures in the current projects. Technological innovations shall be selected based on first responders’ legacy systems, and develop to comply, by design, with national and EU with national and European legal and ethical provisions and with policy and standards.

Recommendation of the second Policy Meeting participants was to give more time to the discussion at the next policy meeting, and not to discuss all questions from scratch, but to be based upon and continue on all the previous findings. The suggested **concrete way ahead** is the need to focus the discussions not on generic questions, but on specific items, to address them one by one and exchange information on such topics as:

- Exchange of trainers;
- Looking at a basic training for CBRN defense through the network of TC and with a focus on:
 - Reconnaissance and Detection (developed in training module)
 - Occupational health, safety and security procedures (what is done elsewhere besides my own country?): exchange of experience;
 - Procedures for decontamination
- Looking at CBRN module by module and see what is applicable.

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ANNEX – CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

Civil-military cooperation: A joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors.

TTF: 1994-0007.

Ser.	Ref. Nº.	Document	Content
1.		Comprehensive Political Guidance	7. e. (...) While NATO has no requirement to develop capabilities strictly for civilian purposes, it needs to improve its practical cooperation, taking into account existing arrangements, with partners, relevant international organisations and, as appropriate, non-governmental organisations in order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations; (...)
2.	C-M(2009)0049 (INV)	NATO's Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats	10. (...) On request from a nation, NATO can offer access to civil expertise to assist the planning and decision-making process. Advice from civil experts may also be offered on other relevant issues such as on national border control, port security and the protection of sensitive materials. (...) 21. NATO will foster host nations' and partners' CBRN defence capabilities, including those of their civilian national authorities, through information exchange, planning, joint training and exercises. (...) 23. (...) However, major civil emergencies can pose a threat to security and stability, and because CBRN consequence management is challenging and could be a massive, costly and protracted effort, NATO will be prepared to lend its

Ser.	Ref. N°.	Document	Content
			<p>capabilities to national authorities, if requested. (...)</p> <p>24. Planning for CBRN consequence management is a multi-dimensional effort, requiring coordination within the Alliance at all levels, as well as with civilian emergency planning authorities and other international organisations, as appropriate. (...)</p> <p>25. NATO will continually review and update its Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan for the Improvement of Civil Preparedness Against Possible Attacks with CBRN Agents to reflect the most recent political guidance; (...).</p>
4.	C-M(2011)0068	PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCED CIVIL MILITARY COOPERATION IN CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) DEFENCE	<p>The proposals aim to:</p> <p>(1) develop a joint civil-military concept paper to allow for coordination across NATO on issues related to CBRN consequence management;</p> <p>(2) investigate modalities to plan and operate in the field of consequence management;</p> <p>(3) investigate possible improvements for internal and external coordination, as appropriate,</p> <p>(4) harmonise CBRN training and exercises with civil and military stakeholders; and</p> <p>(5) enhance civil-military cooperation for communication to the public during a CBRN event.</p>
5.		NATO's policy guidelines on counter-terrorism	<p>11. Capabilities: (...) NATO will also strive to maintain its operational capacity and capitalise on the lessons learned in operations, including experience gained through Special Operations Forces. Training, education and exercises based on different threat scenarios will continue to improve interoperability</p>

Ser.	Ref. N°.	Document	Content
			<p>by assimilating lessons learned and best practices. These capabilities may also be offered to Allies in support of civil emergency planning and the protection of critical infrastructure, particularly as it may relate to counter-terrorism, as requested.</p> <p>12. Engagement: (...) Particular emphasis will be placed on raising awareness, capacity building, civil-emergency planning and crisis management in order to respond to specific needs of partner countries and Allied interests.</p>
7.	MC 0334/1	NATO PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR HOST NATION SUPPORT	<p>9. (...) The purpose of [<i>civil-military cooperation</i>] (CIMIC) is to establish and maintain full cooperation between NATO forces and the civilian population and institutions within a commander’s area of operations in order to create the most advantageous civil-military conditions. (...)</p>
8.	MC 0343/1	NATO MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS (IDRO)	<p>3. (...), five roles for CEP have been identified (...):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Civil Support for Alliance military operations under Article 5; b. support for non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations; c. support for national authorities in civil emergencies; d. support for national authorities in the protection of populations against the effects of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and e. cooperation with Partners. <p>10. a. NATO’s immediate military assistance to future IDRO may include any or all of the following:</p> <p>(1) Assistance and advice by the NMAs to the EADRCC and to the Civil Emergency Crisis Cell, if established on the suitability, use and deployment of NATO-owned or</p>

Ser.	Ref. N°.	Document	Content
			<p>controlled military assets and capabilities in response to requests for disaster relief assistance;</p> <p>(2) the activation of the LCC in order to provide advice and assistance on the provision of NATO-owned or controlled military assets and capabilities; (...)</p>
10.	MC 0411/2	<p>NATO MILITARY POLICY ON CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC) AND CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION (CMI)</p>	<p>17. Primary responsibilities for stabilisation and reconstruction normally lie with non-military authorities and other non-military actors. Therefore, any form of military support to Stabilisation and Reconstruction (S&R) will require close communication between military and non-military actors, both within NATO and outside.</p> <p>20. Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS). NATO has established a database to provide trained, experienced civilian stabilisation and reconstruction experts to the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs). The use of such experts should be considered during preparation for, and execution of, operations. (...)</p> <p>37. CIMIC personnel and assets support, facilitate or directly conduct [<i>civil-military interaction</i>] (CMI) through activities including especially: civil-military liaison and civil assessment, as well as planning, coordination with other capabilities/functions involved in CMI and enabling local legitimized authorities in the resolution of the crisis. (...)</p> <p>40. i. In accordance with the applicable OPLAN and any strategic political-military plan, including the NAC Initiating Directive, empowers and tasks deployed NATO force commanders to undertake effective cooperation and coordination with</p>

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			indigenous local legitimized authorities and in-theatre principals from other international actors as well as NATO civilians; (...)
	AC/333-N(2018)0033	REPORT OF THE 2018 WORKSHOP ON CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN RESPONSE TO A LARGE-SCALE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) TERRORIST ATTACK	<p>5. RECOMMENDATIONS</p> <p>The appropriate NATO bodies and committees are recommended to:</p> <p>A. Develop non-binding guidelines for enhanced civil military cooperation to deal with the consequences of large-scale CBRN events associated with a terrorist attack, based on the guidance provided at the Workshop.</p> <p>B. Review the EADRCC CBRN inventory (categories, methods of updating, prioritization).</p> <p>C. Incorporate the forensic and legal/criminal investigatory aspects of responding to a CBRN terrorist attack into NATO training courses, programmes and exercises to ensure NATO military and civilian personnel are prepared to address those challenges unique to a terrorist attack.</p>
16.	AC/98-D(2019)0001-REV1	Non-binding guidelines for enhanced civil-military cooperation to deal with the consequences of large-scale CBRN events associated with terrorist attacks	<p>9. Allies have agreed to baseline requirements for resilience in seven strategic sectors (continuity of government, energy, population movements, food and water resources, mass casualties, civil communications, and transport systems). The resilience work in these seven sectors has focused on upholding three core functions for civil preparedness: Continuity of Government; Continuity of essential services to the population and Civil Support to the Military. (...).</p> <p>10. (...) Military support to civil authorities should be integrated into</p>

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			<p>existing emergency operations plans, procedures, training and exercises whenever possible. (...).</p> <p>13. Military authorities should evaluate requests received from civilian authorities for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Readiness (impact on the military’s ability to perform its primary mission: war fighting); • Cost (including the source of funding); and • Legality (compliance with relevant laws, plans, and procedures). <p>14. (...) Examples [<i>of required assignments</i>], but not exhaustive, include: (...)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medical (e.g., extraction units and patient evacuation, medical personnel, field hospitals and mortuary services); • On site response (e.g. hazardous material sampling; handling, analysis, and transportation of contaminated CBRN material; decontamination; containment and population protection measures; search & rescue and Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), units able to cross or to reach heavily contaminated areas, even by gamma radiations, using special vehicles); (...). <p>15. Military authorities can serve in a supporting role to civilian emergency managers.</p> <p>18. The military should be prepared to identify personnel and resources to support civilian planning for prevention, preparedness, response, and mitigation operations. In addition, it will be necessary to identify how those military resources will be integrated into response operations.</p>
17.	AC/330-WP(2019)0002-REV1 (INV)	GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL-MILITARY	UNDER DEVELOPMENT!

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		MEDICAL COOPERATION IN RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) MASS CASUALTY INCIDENTS	
18.	AC/281-N(2011)0205 (R)	Considerations and Suggestions regarding EU and NATO Activities on CBRN	<p>5. (...) Allies have also agreed on the need to continue improving civil-military cooperation in the CBRN domain.</p> <p>9. (ii) In line with policy guidance, work is ongoing to enhance cooperation between civilian and military actors involved in CBRN defence, such as between civilian and military planners and responders to CBRN events/incidents.</p> <p>9. (v) (...) The Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence has developed a civilian training curriculum for first responders to familiarise potential military “first responders” with civilian approaches.</p> <p>9. (vi) Exercises are being conducted, including by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), to practice, harmonise and develop CBRN procedures in order to improve nations’ ability to respond to a disaster, and to reinforce the idea that military and civilian capabilities must complement each other.</p>
19.	PO(2019)0085 (INV)	NATO HQ Strategic Communications Framework on WMD Non-Proliferation and CBRN Defence	6. (...) National preparation includes ensuring civil-military arrangements are in place and prepared to handle the consequences of a CBRN incident or attack, including decontamination and the medical response to mass casualties. (...)

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20.		A Practical Guide to Public Information during a Crisis (Budapest Guidelines III)	Foreword. (...) Civil preparedness will be improved by achieving the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience, which focus on continuity of government, continuity of essential services, security of critical civilian infrastructure, and support to military forces with civilian means. (...).
21.		Checklist and Non-Binding Guidelines for the Request, Reception and Provision Of International Assistance in the Event of a CBRN Incident or Natural Disaster	12. Should foreign military capabilities be requested, nations should have in place procedures covering: terms and conditions of deployment, whether the military may be armed or not, use of national uniforms and mechanisms for cooperation with civil actors of the requesting nation. 13. Assisting nations should ensure that any military or security-focused relief teams guard against public confusion as to the distinction between their roles and those of humanitarian organisations. Pursuant to the Oslo Guidelines, military or security-focused teams should generally avoid providing direct (i.e. face-to-face) assistance to affected persons and instead focus on indirect or infrastructure support.
22.	AJP-1(E)	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE	1.9. c. (...) Integrating the military instrument early into a collective strategy is critical and is enabled at a high level by continuous effective civil-military interaction (CMI). (...). 1.10. Complementary capabilities. Although not instruments of national power, the capabilities of states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international or regional organizations can have wide utility in operations. These capabilities include areas such as the judiciary, constabulary, civilian administration,

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			<p>contractors and commercial partners. It also includes the infrastructure that enables medical care, food distribution, power generation, and water and sanitation services. The Alliance must be prepared to plan for employing coordinated military and civil capabilities to fill gaps in creating stabilization and reconstruction effects (in the interim) until conditions allow these activities to be transferred.</p> <p>2.7. NATO's engagement in a comprehensive approach to resolve crises is facilitated through civil-military interaction (CMI) which applies to all military bodies and at all levels. (...).</p> <p>4.7. Civil-military interaction and civil-military cooperation. Military activities are seldom entirely successful in creating, and sustaining, desired effects without the involvement of non-military actors. The military commander's aims and methods should be, at a minimum, harmonized with those of supporting civilian agencies as part of the contribution to a comprehensive approach. Civil-military interaction (CMI) is key to this. CIMIC, as a joint function, is the main facilitator of CMI.</p>
23.	AJP-3(C)	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS	<p>1.25 Commanders can improve the ability to work effectively internally through civil-military interaction with planning staffs and externally with partner countries and other national and international non-military actors; IOs, governmental organizations, NGOs, HN and local authorities, thus enhancing synergy at all levels.</p> <p>1.41 (...) Common to joint operations at all levels are the functions; manoeuvre, fires, command and control, intelligence,</p>

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			<p>information, sustainment, force protection and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).</p> <p>1.59 Civil-military cooperation. CIMIC is a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of CMI with diverse non-military actors.</p> <p>1.60 CIMIC enables the commander to create, influence and sustain conditions that will promote the achievement of objectives, and thereby maximize the effectiveness of the military contribution to the overall mission. (...).</p> <p>A.12 Civil-military cooperation (J-9). Civil-military cooperation staff provides a capability that support a commander to achieve their objectives across the full range of NATO operations through interaction with appropriate non-military actors. In particular the civil-military cooperation staff takes a leading role in gathering, assessing and reporting information regarding the civil environment in cooperation with other military functions. CIMIC-staff should understand the environment in which they will operate and understand the workings of NGOs and IOs. They are capable of explaining military requirements to non-military actors and vice versa. Finally, they are able to carry out accurate assessments and provide advice to the commander.</p>
24.	AJP-3.2(A)	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR LAND OPERATIONS	0169. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) is defined as: the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as

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			<p>international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. Given that the land component operates amongst civil populations, CIMIC capabilities play a key information activity for the land component commander. It has three components:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • liaison between military and civilian authorities; • gaining civil support for military operations; and • coordinating military support for civil interests.
25.	AJP-3.5(B)	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS	<p>4.10 b. When the SOCC is appointed by the JTF commander as supported component the other components can provide a variety of capabilities. The SOCC will determine the support required from the supporting commands. In particular but not limited to:</p> <p>(5) Provide combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) (e.g. (...), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defence, (...)).</p> <p>5.3 c. (...) SOF commanders are empowered to conduct necessary cooperation and coordination to execute operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. They should proactively build mutually beneficial and trust-based relationships to achieve effective collaboration. This includes working with international, indigenous, and local authorities and actors facilitated through civil-military interaction (CMI). These relationships are founded on shared understanding and a commitment to work towards a comprehensive solution. These relationships must be structured, timely, and at the appropriate level to ensure consistency of message and reduce</p>

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			<p>the risk of misperception. This emphasizes the need for close synchronization of SOF and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) activities throughout an operation. CIMIC supports SOF with respect to a comprehensive understanding of the civil environment. (...).</p>
26.	AJP-3.8(B)	<p>ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COMPREHENSIVE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR DEFENCE</p>	<p>2.13 d. Interoperability. All components of the force should consider CBRN defence interoperability and harmonization of both military and civilian capabilities.</p> <p>2.16.1 Planning for CBRN incident recovery is a multi-dimensional effort, requiring continuous coordination with the HN, including its civilian emergency planning authorities, as well as with participating partner nations and other International Organisations (IO), as appropriate. Recovery aims to restore freedom of action as quickly as possible.</p> <p>3.19.2 c. Operations and Planning. (...) CBRN defence specialist assets are coordinated and assigned within the JOA by the CBRN defence staff. These assets may be a mix of military and civilian organisations/agencies from different nations that have various specialized capabilities and will require careful coordination to achieve optimum effect.</p> <p>3.19.2 j. Civil [-] Military Cooperation (CIMIC). The CIMIC staff is responsible for advising the JFC Commander on the implications of all CBRN defence activities which directly concern relations between the joint force and local government, civil population, IO, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), and other organisations/ agencies in</p>

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			<p>the JOA. Local civilian authorities have prime responsibility for dealing with CBRN incidents within their areas of responsibility but, if their resources are inadequate, they may request assistance. Similarly, the joint force may request support from civilian authorities before, during and after a CBRN incident.</p>
27.	AJP-3.10.1(B)	<p>ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS</p>	<p>0128. Relationship with Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) (...). Although PSYOPS and CIMIC can be mutually supporting, PSYOPS staffs must be mindful of the sensibilities of certain organizations and never allow the impression that CIMIC is being used as a PSYOPS tool. However, CIMIC interaction with civil agencies and populations will aid wider headquarters knowledge development and assist with understanding the information environment and the audiences within it. PSYOPS campaigns may affect the attitudes of population groups and so help make an area more permissive for CIMIC. Similarly, the physical effects of CIMIC operations may improve audiences' attitudes to NATO and hence make them more receptive to PSYOPS messages. (...).</p>
28.	AJP-3.19(A)	<p>ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION</p>	<p>4.7 Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defence. The aim of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defence is to prevent CBRN incidents, and protect populations, territories and forces against, and assist in recovering from, such incidents and their effects. Consequently, the commander will have to plan, coordinate, and execute operations within a comprehensive approach using</p>

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			<p>increased civil-military interaction (CMI). This will improve coordination and cooperation, ensuring a more holistic approach in responding to a CBRN incident. Local civilian authorities have prime responsibility for dealing with CBRN incidents within their jurisdiction but, if their resources are inadequate, they may request assistance. For NATO, the Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC) will be involved. CIMIC should facilitate the coordination between the joint task force and the CEPC. Similarly, the joint task force may request support from civilian authorities before, during, and after a CBRN incident.</p>
29.	AJP-4.10(B)	ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR MEDICAL SUPPORT	<p>1.4.9. 2. With the approval of the commander and in accordance with the tasks assigned in the OPLAN, J9 staff may request medical staff to provide non-emergency medical assistance to the local population in accordance with the established humanitarian support concept in theatre and national regulations of the TCN. In assessing whether a military response should be provided, medical staffs must establish that the task is one that, if undertaken, will facilitate a return to normality for the local community. (...).</p> <p>5.13. 1. Consequence Management. (...) Most agree that an international response is optimal, using both civil and military assets to meet such events. Currently, NATO policy on military response and coordination with civil organizations exists. In the case of CBRN events though, spreading agents or contaminants may require immediate action and could quickly overwhelm even the most prepared nation(s). CM deals with the military</p>

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			<p>capability to react and respond to such an event.</p> <p>5.13. 6. Medical considerations include, but are not limited to, medical assessment/detection of the event, decontamination, recommendations on force protection (vaccines and antidotes), medical countermeasures, psychological support, epidemiological surveillance, victim identification, and health education.</p>
30.	AJMedP-6(A)	ALLIED JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY MEDICAL INTER-FACE DOCTRINE	<p>1.2.10 Disaster Relief. Disaster Relief is the organised response to alleviate the situation resulting from a catastrophe (natural or manmade). The aims of disaster relief are to save life and lessen suffering, limit damage and restore essential services to a level that enables local authorities to cope. Characteristics are fast response and unusual patient patterns. Due to their nature these operations include a large portion of medical support. In certain cases where medical assistance is in the focus of the operation the medical force might even be in the lead and therefore be supported by the components of a joint force.</p> <p>1.2.11 Consequence Management. Consequence Management (CM) is the use of reactive measures to mitigate the destructive efforts of attacks, incidents or natural disasters. This includes the effects of terrorism including effects from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Medical Consequence Management therefore may be similar to those measures used in Disaster Relief Operations while taking the specialty of medical support in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) environment into account.</p>

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			<p>3.2.4. 2. In CBRN environments military medical support may on occasions be the only operational medical asset available. Military medical support to the civilian population in such an environment might therefore require a more substantial medical footprint. This should be borne in mind during the planning process.</p>
31.	<p>AJMedP-7(A) UNDER REVISION</p>	<p>ALLIED JOINT MEDICAL DOCTRINE FOR SUPPORT TO CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS</p>	<p>2.6.3. 4. In the aftermath of a CBRN incident, medical support and public health service facilities may be strained beyond their capacities. Demands for medical support to both military and civilian populations could be intense. Medical support planning must assist the commander in establishing priorities and effectively using available medical support and public health service resources. To assure adequate support to the joint force, command directives concerning extent to which treatment is provided to civilian populations must be clear and adhered to by the Allied force medical support personnel and facilities.</p> <p>2.8. 2. Any NATO military medical response to a CBRN terrorist attack must be closely coordinated with national civil authorities, who retain responsibility for consequence management.</p> <p>5.2.3. 1. Casualty decontamination reduces the threat of continued or increasing contamination-related injury to contaminated individuals, as well as limiting exposure to medical support personnel and otherwise unexposed casualties. Casualty decontamination will have to be accomplished as the operation and casualty load allows. Decontamination and triage of CBRN casualties will obviously vary</p>

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			<p>with the situation and the contaminant. For most CBRN exposures, decontamination should be given priority over treatment or stabilization of a casualty, as the latter can often be delayed without putting the casualty at additional risk. (...).</p> <p>5.2.3. 2. Within the theatre, decentralization of casualty decontamination is necessary. Casualties must not be forced to wait at central points for decontamination. (...).</p> <p>7.1. 4. Civilian casualties may be a significant problem in populated areas. Planning for medical support under CBRN conditions should include to what degree and under what conditions military medical support is provided to civilians. (...).</p>
32.	ATP-3.8.1 VOLUME I UNDER REVISION	CBRN DEFENCE ON OPERATIONS	<p>04B05. 3. The J3 CBRN defence staff plan, establish and maintain, with J6 CIS a CBRN W&R capability for the timely reporting of CBRN incidents and warning of their consequences within the Joint Force, to other forces and the JFC and Strategic Commands. Make arrangements with J6 CIS and J9 Civil-military Cooperation (CIMIC) for the integration, if feasible, of the Joint Force CIS and CBRN W&R capability with the HN emergency services.</p> <p>04B11. 1. J9 CIMIC are responsible for advising the JFC on the implications of all CBRN defence activities which directly concern relations between the Joint Force and local government, civil population, international organizations (IOs), NGOs and other agencies in-theatre. Local civilian authorities have prime responsibility for dealing with CBRN incidents within their areas of responsibility. However, if their resources</p>

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			<p>are inadequate they may request assistance. This assistance may be from the Joint Force to HN or vice versa. (...).</p>
35.		<p>ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS PLANNING DIRECTIVE COPD INTERIM V2.0</p>	<p>1-2. d. Planning in a multi-dimensional environment generates particular challenges for both civilian and military actors. Experience shows that not only may there be no formally appointed lead agency to provide overall coordination, but that those organisations capable of reacting quickly are very often military in nature. In addition, some institutions may not wish to have formalised relationships with others.</p> <p>1-6. (3) Operations planning in support of NATO's Contribution to the Comprehensive Approach must be underpinned by a culture of mutual respect, trust, transparency and understanding. This is built through information sharing and practical cooperation and must be encouraged to allow collaboration and cooperation across NATO bodies, among civil and military actors, and with relevant non-NATO actors and local authorities.</p> <p>2-1. e. (3) While the structure and processes of each headquarters may be unique, ideally all those involved in NATO planning and operations would have some resident civil expertise and additional mechanisms to obtain further specialist advice when required.</p> <p>3-4. (1) a. (d.) [NATO HQ – IS/OPS] Civil-Military Planning and Support (CMPS) Section. The CMPS Section maintains: a Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) database of national civil experts in the political, stabilization and reconstruction and media fields; and a roster of other civil experts from business/industry</p>

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			<p>and governments/administrations of Member and/or Partner countries with expertise in areas such as: (...); Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); (...).</p> <p>3-29. b. (4) (i) Civil-Military Co-operation. Specific direction to subordinate commands should be given to generate requirements or focus their operational-level planning regarding [Civil-Military Interaction] (CMI).</p>
36.	SH/PLANS/JCAP/FCP/16-311533 5000/FPR-0460/TTE-151451/Ser:NU0083	Bi-SC CAPABILITY CODES AND CAPABILITY STATEMENTS	<p>CBRN-BN-HQ 2.05. Capable of establishing and maintaining liaison with civilian (IO/NGOs and local representatives and authorities, emergency services, police, commercial, medical and industrial) organisations.</p> <p>CBRN-JAT 2.03. Capable of liaison and coordination with Civil Emergency Planning organisations and national/civilian authorities.</p>
37.	11845/14	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Countermeasures Concept for EU-Led Military Operations	<p>18. f. [<i>One can identify the following deterrent countermeasures:</i>] Educate and inform populations in order to enhance assistance to the protection of the civilian populations; (...).</p> <p>18. h. Communicate about the policy, military and civil capabilities and readiness. Establish a CBRN-related media policy and demonstrate capabilities.</p> <p>19. c. (2) (b) W&R systems are vital to allow commanders and staff to assess the impact of CBRN incidents both on plans and ongoing operations. It is also important to liaise with the relevant civil authorities. (...).</p> <p>19. g. In case of suspicion or proof of terrorist act, cooperation and action of relevant military and</p>

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			<p>civilian bodies is necessary in order to recognise circumstances and consequently suspects.</p> <p>25. Yet, response to a CBRN incident is unlikely to be conducted in isolation. In normal conditions, no single civil or military capability, agency or military unit possesses the capacity and expertise to act unilaterally on many complex issues that may arise in response to CBRN incidents.</p> <p>27. Providing assistance to civilian population affected by a CBRN incident may include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Saving lives and preventing human suffering; b. Providing support to displaced personnel; c. Preventing/reducing additional damage; d. Providing mortuary affairs support; e. Providing emergency mitigation of CBRN hazards; f. Providing minimum emergency restoration of life support services; g. Conducting non-combatant evacuation operations.
38.	COM(2014) 247 final	A new EU approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E risks	<p>III.1. The Commission will (...) build on existing EU networks, and explore together with Member States the establishment of a civil-military cooperation group in the areas of a) detection technologies, and b) methods to counter improvised explosive devices, man-portable air defence systems (MANPADs) and other relevant threats, such as CBRN threats.</p> <p>III.3. 5. The recently adopted legislation on the EU Civil Protection Mechanism¹⁴ paves the way for the creation of a European Emergency Response Capacity in the form of a voluntary pool of pre-committed</p>

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			<p>response capacities. This includes specific capacities dealing with CBRN incidents (e.g. CBRN detection and sampling modules and Urban Search and Rescue teams for CBRN conditions).</p>
39.	COM(2017) 610 final	<p>Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks</p>	<p>BUILDING UPON THE 2010-2015 CBRN ACTION PLAN</p> <p>(...) They [= <i>EU member states</i>] underlined also the need to develop cooperation with other partners not covered by the previous CBRN Action Plan, such as military and key third countries. (...).</p> <p>SETTING OUT A MORE FOCUSED AND COORDINATED APPROACH</p> <p>(...) Cooperation and coordination with EU strategic and regional partners is essential, and synergies will be sought with all relevant stakeholders, including military actors, the EDA and NATO, as well as the private sector. (...).</p>
40.	COM(2018) 470 final	<p>Fifteenth Progress Report towards an effective and genuine Security Union</p>	<p>II.1. (...) The Commission is also enhancing institutional and community capacities on CBRN in partner countries in the European Neighbourhood. Moreover, the Union is taking concrete steps to develop closer cooperation with NATO on CBRN, including on civil preparedness. EU representatives participated as observers in a workshop organised by NATO on civil-military cooperation in response to a large-scale CBRN terrorist attack. Moreover, the EU and NATO consider creating a joint awareness raising training module for decision-makers on CBRN. (...).</p>