



eNOTICE

European Network Of CBRN Training Centres

D4.8 eNOTICE Recommendations for CBRN R&D and CBRN policies. Version 1

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Executive Summary

This document is Deliverable 4.8 (eNOTICE Recommendations for CBRN R&D and CBRN policies. Version 1) of eNOTICE, a European Horizon 2020 EC funded project, under the Grant Agreement n° 740521.

This document provides the European and national policy context and relevance of eNOTICE to the objectives of the European policy regarding CBRN training centres, testing and demonstration sites' role in CBRN preparedness, response and recovery, recent expansion of the project scope with the collaboration with DG DEVCO. Then the deliverable presents the detailed report on the policy meeting with representatives of DG HOME, DG DEVCO and DG ECHO that took place during the eNOTICE Joint Activity exercise Bio Garden on June 20, 2018. The results, major key points, conclusions and way forward considerations are summarised in the end of the document.

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1 Objectives and scope

The current Deliverable 4.8 presents the first results of the work under the Task 4.3 Identification of opportunities to strengthen policies and recommendations for R&D – M3-M60: UCL (lead); VESTA, ARMINES, UPB, JCBRND COE, UNITOV.

As the ultimate goal of the eNOTICE project is strengthening national and cross-border capacity for CBRN incidents preparedness (incl. training) and response, this task will contribute to this goal through the identification of opportunities to align policies and recommendations for national, European and international R&D. Input will be gathered from the evaluation and follow up of the joint activities (Task 4.2) and from discussions with EU policy makers, such as representatives from DG HOME, DG ECHO, DG DEVCO, JRC and others. Possible synergies between civil and military policies, and a closer relationship with NATO in order to align activities and to avoid competition will also be considered. Four concrete initiatives have at this stage been identified for their obvious link with the eNOTICE objectives: DG HOME's Community of Users, DG ECHO's Disaster management Training network, DG DEVCO's CBRN Centre of Excellence and the JRC's Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre. Moreover, through the eNOTICE partner JCBRND COE, who is NATO Department Head for Weapons of Mass Destruction/CBRN Defence Education and Training (WMD/CBRND DH) a link with the already existing network of military CBRN Defence TC and the recently established European Union Military Training Group (EU MTG) is created. Without excluding any other network, these 5 networks will be invited to the eNOTICE activities as privileged partners. They will be invited to the joint activities as observers and a side event will be dedicated to learn from the joint activities, to inform each other on individual progress, to discuss opportunities, to align and mutually strengthen policies, to set priorities and identify opportunities for other activities with common or complementing objectives. A specific focus will be on more practitioners' needs-driven research. From these meetings, joint declarations with recommendations for CBRN policies in general and national and EC R&D programmes in particular will be elaborated. They will be proposed to all the eNOTICE consortium partners for feedback and validation and proposed to the national authorities, REA and the DG's concerned. UCL leads, based on its experience in R&D and policy initiatives. VESTA, ARMINES, UPB, JCBRND COE and UNITOV contribute with their respective knowledge on civil and military CBRN policies and on needs for CBRN R&D.

1.1 The importance of synergy in the field of CBRN

Over the past years, the threat of CBRN intentional attacks, technological accidents or natural hazards has led governments and international organisations to adopt far-reaching regulations and programmes to defend populations against the associated risks, while complementing national measures that address existing gaps and promote exchanges of information and best practices. The CBRN policy stated in the CBRN Action Plan [1] builds on a number of measures taken recently both by Member States and the European Union. Among various aspects related to CBRN preparedness and response, the CBRN Action Plan calls for strengthening cooperation, unification of efforts and synergies between all the involved actors, with a major focus on updated first responders training in all security areas. Mapping of the stakeholders and understanding the needs of each group of stakeholders as well as their expectations from the network of CBRN training centres that eNOTICE is building is therefore in line with this the major objectives of this plan, making eNOTICE a highly valuable partner to propose concrete lines of action through training and education centres of "security stakeholders" in the broad sense of the word. This, in turn, should contribute to give this

network a louder voice and greater representatively which are a pre-requirement for long-term sustainability. At the same time, along with contacting and mapping the stakeholders of different groups as previously described (Section 2 of deliverable D2.3 Mapping and needs and gaps analysis of the CBRN stakeholders), concerns, challenges and possible obstacles for the functional and operational viability of the network were identified. The point was clearly made that the key to reach the objectives is to develop cross-functional synergy between members of the eNOTICE consortium and its network through regular joint activities involving targeted stakeholders.

Consulted on the implementation of the 2010-2015 Action Plan [2], MS reported a large number of activities taking place at national level, including trainings and exercises. As commented in the new CBRN action plan 2017 “MS reported difficulties in ensuring coordination of different actors”. Based on this, it is appears that knowledge on CBRN risks should be deepened, and cross-sector cooperation should be promoted. This implies further investments in cross-border/cross-sectoral trainings and exercises, *ideally organised in a structured way and following pre-agreed curricula* [as per CBRN action plan 2017], a requirement where the EU added value is clear and the contribution of eNOTICE expected. Furthermore, information exchange on CBRN incidents, threats, equipment and technologies aimed at tackling CBRN threats need be strengthened, an area where eNOTICE has also its role to play, especially through the nascent cooperation with partners not covered by the previous CBRN Action Plan, such as military and key third countries (cf the current collaborative agreement with DEVCO for including the CBRN CoE in the eNOTICE network, see below).

For eNOTICE, cooperation and coordination with EU strategic and regional partners is therefore essential and synergies will be actively sought with all relevant security stakeholders, including military actors, the EDA and NATO, as well as with the private sector for what technological innovations related to better prevention, protection and response to CBRN risks are concerned.

Persistent effort of the eNOTICE consortium to create a mechanism of synergy between civilian and military stakeholders will also have a positive impact of transnational, cross border cooperation and will usefully complement other EU-driven initiatives (e.g. training sessions and exercises at the EU level focusing on cross-sectoral cooperation after a radiological dirty bomb attack, trainings organised by Europol and CEPOL).

Synergy developed within the eNOTICE network (a) will help (a) develop a EU expert support structure which can provide guidance and advice also on technical and scientific issues to MS and EU institutions on CBRN security, and during incidents, (a) will facilitate the identification and dissemination of good practices and lessons learned, (c) will help share expertise and liaise with existing CBRN centres of excellence in Europe and outside.

1.2 Relevance of eNOTICE objectives to the European and national policy

With regards to CBRN, the key EU policy is represented by the CBRN Action Plan [1] (DG HOME) as already commented here above in 1.1. This Action Plan builds upon the work launched in the EU with the 2010-2015 CBRN Action Plan [2]. It addresses the gaps identified in its implementation and takes into account emerging threats. At EU level, the Action Plan has led to a better understanding of the threat, more information sharing (development of a CBRN Glossary [3] and inclusion of CBRN incidents in the European Bomb Data System), and achievements such as the development of an EU training infrastructure (European Nuclear Security Training Centre – EUSECTRA). The biological area has also seen an important

legislative development with the adoption of Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to health [4]. eNOTICE monitors all these initiatives and regulations aimed at strengthening CBRN preparedness, training and response planning in the EU.

eNOTICE activities in mapping of existing EU training activities and providing cross-border and cross-sectoral trainings and exercises respond exactly to well-defined CBRN Action Plan priorities (Table 1).

Other EU policies include CBRN as a new specific area of expertise to be developed and strengthened CBRN national focal point appointed by MS, namely in the sectors of Civil Protection and humanitarian Aid (DG ECHO), Health and Food Safety (DG SANTE), as well as Energy Infrastructure and Transport Networks (DGs ENER and MOVE), Customs (DG TAXUD), Environment and Industrial Risks (DG ENV) and International Cooperation, e.g. CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative (DG DEVCO, JRC and UNICRI).

Complementary to EU policies, international policies are also active in Disaster Risk and Crisis Management. In the case of CBRN, various conventions exist, namely the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 [5], the Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC controlled by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, OPCW), the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC without control mechanisms), and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [6] (NPT controlled by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA). In the field of Disaster Risk Management, Disaster Risk Reduction has been the core action line of the United Nations Hyogo Framework for Action [7] on how to mitigate the impact of natural and man-made disasters, now continued by the Sendai Framework for Action setting priorities for the 2015-2030 period [8], among which the promotion of a better understanding of disaster risk management through the building, sharing and development of knowledge and the strengthening of the policy-science interface at local, national, regional and global levels. Added to this is the recent launch of the Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre (DRMKC) under the aegis of JRC for which one of the new focuses is CBRN hazards.

The implementation of these policies represents a complex and ambitious challenge as they involve a wide variety of players whereas each Member State often follows its own specific national approach (national action plans) for dealing with crises and is also specifically organised in terms of disaster risk management capabilities. Although national sovereignty cannot be challenged, the EU framework represents certainly a means and a real opportunity to develop synergies and exploit complementarities, and to improve coordination among the various national approaches while developing a common EU vision strengthened by a joint CBRN strategy, based on pooling and sharing of knowledge and resources.

TABLE 1: CBRN Action Plan 2017 : field of congruence with eNOTICE objectives and activities

Adapted from COM(2017) 610 final: Action Plan to enhance preparedness against CBRN security risks (18.10.2017)

OBJECTIVE 2:	ENSURING A MORE ROBUST PREPAREDNESS FOR AND RESPONSE TO CBRN SECURITY INCIDENTS
2.1 Strengthen EU CBRN preparedness and response through cross- sectorial training and exercises	Action: The Commission in cooperation with Member States will <u><i>strengthen training and exercises for first responders from the law enforcement, civil protection, health structures</i></u> and, where relevant, borders and customs authorities and military partners <i>[Contribution of eNOTICE network]</i> .
2.7 Improving awareness, preparedness and response to bio-risks, including emerging threats	Action: <u><i>Strengthen EU's cross-sectoral awareness on bio-risks arising from accidental or voluntary releases through training, and support MS in their fight against bioterrorism</i></u> , including elaboration of national preparedness strategies for bioterrorism issues via development (in collaboration with network of experts from Member States <i>[Contribution of eNOTICE network]</i>) of an EU focused handbook on bioterrorism threats.
2.8 CBRN detection pool of Member States' experts	Action: Extend the explosives detection pool to CBRN experts with a view to assist MS with e.g. securing large scale events. Activities of the detection pool will be based – among others - on the <u><i>guidance material developed for the protection of public spaces [Potential contribution of eNOTICE network]</i></u> .
2.9 Reinforce nuclear security capacities and networks	Action: Promote full use of European Nuclear Security Training Centre (EUSECTRA) for <u><i>joint trainings in radiological and nuclear detection [Contribution of eNOTICE network]</i></u> .
OBJECTIVE 3:	BUILDING STRONGER INTERNAL-EXTRNAL LINKS AND ENGAGEMENT IN CBRN SECURITY WITH KEY REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL EU PARTNERS
3.1 Develop CBRN security cooperation with key international partners	Action: <u><i>Deepen cooperation with strategic partners experienced with CBRN:</i></u> (1) sharing of information on CBRN threat and risks; (2) exchange of best practices; (3) joint trainings or exercises <i>[Contribution of eNOTICE network]</i> .
3.2 Develop cooperation with NATO on CBRN related issues	Action: <u><i>Work towards closer cooperation with NATO in relation to third countries, notably in the fields of: (1) information exchange; (2) capacity building; (3) training; (4) exercises.</i></u> <u><i>Develop synergies with NATO on how counter-terrorism may benefit from defence capability development inter alia in the areas of Unmanned Airborne Vehicles (UAVs), and Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons [Contribution of eNOTICE network]</i></u> In cooperation with the NATO-accredited CBRN Centre of Excellence design tailor made training modules for EU CBRN Centre of Excellence partners.

3.3 Develop cooperation with specialised international organisations	Action: The EEAS and Commission will engage with specialised multilateral organisations (Interpol, IAEA, OPCW22, BWC ISU23, UNODA24) <i>to share best practices [Potential contribution of eNOTICE network]</i> and look for synergies notably in the field of information sharing and capacity-building in third countries.
OBJECTIVE 4:	ENHANCING OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CBRN RISKS
4.1 Creation of an EU CBRN security network	<p>At present, CBRN expertise is distributed unevenly within the European Union and spread across many different governmental, academic and private actors. An EU-wide framework is needed to bring relevant actors together, to build partnerships across these sectors, collectively identify further needs and harness the benefits of EU Research.</p> <p><i><u>To improve coordination at EU level, an EU CBRN security network will pool together all CBRN actors at both strategic (policy-making) and operational levels to overcome the fragmentation of efforts [Contribution of eNOTICE network].</u></i> It will bring together Member States, EU institutions and relevant agencies, and where appropriate key international partners and the private sector. The network will rely on three pillars: (1) an advisory group bringing together all CBRN security coordinators of the MS, (2) <i><u>a support network composed of existing CBRN centres across the EU [Contribution of eNOTICE network]</u></i> and (3) a CBRN knowledge hub set up in the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) in Europol.</p> <p>Its objectives will be to (1) maintain a comprehensive and updated understanding of CBRN risks coming from inside and outside EU and to support the formulation of policies and initiatives to address identified gaps; (2) develop cooperation and coordination at operational level (e.g. information exchange, exchange of best practices); and (3) facilitate civil-military cooperation in areas which are mutually beneficial.</p>
4.1.2 Creation of an EU CBRN Support Network	Action: <i><u>At operational level, an EU CBRN Support Network composed of existing CBRN centres of expertise and networks [contribution of eNOTICE network] will feed into the CBRN Security Advisory Group</u></i> in: (1) developing a EU expert support structure (in close cooperation with Europol) which can provide guidance and advice also on technical and scientific issues to Member States and EU institutions on CBRN security, including during incidents; (2) <i><u>facilitating the identification and dissemination of good practices and lessons learned;</u></i> (3) sharing expertise and liaising with existing CBRN centres of excellence in Europe and outside. Interested Member States will be asked to identify by December 2017 structures which could feed into an EU CBRN Support Network.
4.1.3 Europol (ECTC) to develop a knowledge hub on CBRN	Action: Europol (ECTC) to develop its existing CBRN team into a knowledge hub <i><u>[Potential contribution of eNOTICE network]</u></i> to support law enforcement authorities on CBRN security, including weapons and threats.
4.2 Harnessing the benefits of EU security research	<i><u>Exploiting better EU security research via dissemination activities for research results, as well as via ensuring that research activities respond to the operational needs in the area of CBRN [Contribution of eNOTICE network].</u></i>

Table 1 legend: the congruent lines of action between the CBRN Action Plan 2017 and eNOTICE are in italic bold and underlined

National CBRN policies - Germany

The German CBRN resilience is regulated by law between the Federal Government and the federal states. It is based on a decentralised concept where the *Federal Office of Civil protection and Disaster Assistance* (BBK) [11] issues a general concept, which is incorporated by the federal states in their CBRN protection plans. The federal states and their municipalities are responsible for the implementation of the civil protection. The following policy statements originate from the general concept for the CBRN protection in the civil protection by the BBK.

Policy	eNOTICE Contribution
In addition to concrete requirements, especially in the process engineering of CBRN-specific capability areas, <u>a transparent standardization of capability profiles at all levels and of all operational elements and organizational units is required</u> . Based on reference scenarios, these <u>capabilities should be translated into concrete, coordinated chains of capabilities on all levels</u> . This should take place primarily for "hazardous situations of national importance".	The capacity label (D2.2), developed by the eNOTICE project, relates to this topic as it supports the standardised categorisation of CBRN-related entities.
<u>CBRN advice is required</u> , which is made available to decision-makers throughout all levels of crisis management and the overall management system in accordance with uniform guidelines by <u>trained expert advisors</u> .	The eNOTICE web-based platform (D3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9) facilitates the exchange of experts on a central EU-wide medium. Furthermore, it can be used to share knowledge and to make trainings accessible to experts from other countries.
The technical support of the framework concept and the further development of the responsibilities must be jointly borne by the Federal Government and by the federal states.	
Coordination with the other areas of the national security system must be institutionalised for the area of CBRN protection.	The eNOTICE community could provide valuable input on requirements and expectations regarding this objective.
Principles must be formulated for the <u>definition of nationwide availability of basic capabilities</u> and the deployment of special elements (such as analytical and medical task forces).	The lessons learned on the catalogization of training centres in eNOTICE could be transferred to the catalogization of deployable elements.
A <u>capability profile of the units and facilities in CBRN protection of civil protection</u> must be defined.	This objective can be partly supported by the eNOTICE catalogue of training centres. eNOTICE lacks the capability profiles of each unit that has equipment or knowledge for CBRN incidents like companies or municipalities.
The willingness and ability of the population to help themselves, even in CBRN incidents, is an indispensable	

requirement for the development of modern civil protection. This requires open and sensitive risk communication.	
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National CBRN policies - France

In France, the CBRN concept is regulated at national level by various laws, decrees, and directives. The state organizes and implements civilian and military capabilities to cope with the multiple risks and threats that may affect the country. The general interdepartmental contract (in French: CGI) meets this requirement by setting, for the next five years (2015-2019), the critical capacities of the civil ministries and the level of their engagement in the response to major crises. These capabilities are set in a framework of fair sufficiency and complementarity with the other actors of the crisis management that are the armies, the local authorities and the operators of vital importance. It includes a general part and two sections dedicated to the security of information systems and the response to NRBC threats [12]

Policy	eNOTICE Contribution
The state organizes and implements civilian and military capabilities to cope with the multiple risks and threats that may affect the country.	The enhancement of CBRN training capacity of the eNOTICE training centres is directly linked with the concept with multi and variable threats.
The national capabilities are set in a framework of complementarity with the armies, the local authorities and the operators of vital importance	The eNOTICE exercises are designed with multiple actors (civilian and military forces), stakeholders (involvement of Critical infrastructure concept) and at different level (both regional and national)
Strengthening protection policies against major threats and risks on transport security (maritime, port, air, train etc...)	The eNOTICE community could provide relevant information on user requirements on that topic
The state continues to strengthen the Security of critical infrastructures policy. It aims to broaden their design to an "all-hazards" approach, including business continuity planning against a wide range of risks.	The improvement of the scenario design that has been developed during the eNOTICE activities cans have a major impact on this topic
Strengthening the resilience and continuity of the Nation's core business	This objective can be partly taken into account by the eNOTICE network of training centres. eNOTICE stakeholders should involve business continuity in the heart of exercise scenario.
The State has a strong willingness to strengthen the security of Information systems in close collaboration	By involvement of its comprehensive community, eNOTICE partnership is able

with competent authorities, experts and stakeholders in this domain	to provide key solutions in terms of exercises in this domain.
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National CBRN policies - Italy

Foreword: the following consideration on the Italian policy concerning CBRNe, and how eNOTICE can impact on them, represent a feedback from an exchange of information with experts belonging to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, and integrated with considerations by the contributors of UNITOV.

1) The framework governing CBRN response in Italy

“The Italian CBRN crises and emergencies management system is framed within two mechanisms that are formally separated although intrinsically integrated: the Civil defence and the Civil protection. While the latter mechanism deals with natural disasters and man-made incidents affecting Italy and determining a situation of “emergency” at national-central, regional or local level, the former copes with the same kind of dangerous events but amounting to a situation of “crisis”. Furthermore, the Civil defence mechanism is triggered to manage crises stemming from man-made intentional activities like criminal, subversive and terrorists actions, or military attacks originating from State and non-State actors. Both the Civil defence and the Civil protection mechanism are structured with a command and control chain, where the Prime Minister takes national decisions supported by different decision-making and coordination committees and ad hoc structures. On-site decision-making and assistance coordination are provided by different kind of local authorities each of them contributing to the response with their own resources. On the operative level, first response is provided by several actors interacting together on the basis of some pre-established criteria.” [13]

2) CBRN security in Italy

In Italy, the CBRN framework is regulated only at national central level by laws, decrees, and directives. The operability of the First Responders (Fire Brigades - Health Urgent Rescue - Law Enforcing) is regulated by Standard Operation Procedures specific of each Organization. The cooperation in operations is usual and, when necessary, coordinated at local level by the Prefects. Besides, in Italy, the part “E” - Explosives (which is also included in the EU CBRN Action Plan as part of the CBRN issue), in a terrorist scenario is considered the prerogative of the Law Enforcement. From the point of view of Civil Defence, Italy does not consider Toxic Industrial incidents or a Nuclear Power Plant release as part of the CBRN matter. These two scenarios are considered a Civil Protection issue. State organizes and implements civilian and military capabilities to cope with the multiple risks and threats that may affect the Country in a Civil Defence environment. With this regards, CBRN is not considered a Civil Protection matter but Civil Protection does cooperate in the general crisis management in case of a CBRN attack. General national guidelines for CBRN do exist. These guidelines, are the ground for descendent plans of the Central State Administrations and, locally, of the Prefects of the Italian Republic (considered always as a Central Authority) coordinating all public or private bodies operating in the territory of competence.

3) CBRN safety in Italy

On the other side, Italy complies with the Directive 2012/18 / EU - Seveso III [14] on the control of major-accident hazards related to dangerous substances (implemented in Italy under Article 21 of Legislative Decree 105/2015) [15], regarding the obligations and procedures envisaged for the preparation of external emergency plans (in Italian “PEE”) establishes:

- The obligation to prepare an external emergency plan for all establishments covered by the legislation in question.
- The competence of the Prefect in the preparation of the plan.
- The obligation to consult the population before its adoption.

Essential, is also the review, updating and testing of the plans. The fulfilment of this provision is rather demanding: in this regard in 2014 a working group, made up of representatives of all the administrations and bodies involved in the "management of Seveso activities" (Department VVF, Min. Environment, ISPRA, ARPA, Civil Protection Dept. etc.) conducted an analysis of the state of implementation of PEE in plants at risk of major accidents. From this analysis, in addition to some critical issues related to the contents of the plans themselves (for example the plan often appears to be excessively articulated or detailed or not calibrated on the real capabilities of the support authorities or on the actual possibilities of the communication and alarm systems), it emerged clearly that testing PEEs is a critical element, not easy to implement.

4) Relevance of eNOTICE objectives to Italian national policy

Despite the lack of a comprehensive and sound Italian national policy on CBRN, a number of training activities are organized at the national level. On the other side, practitioners like the Italian National Fire Corps, Civil Protection, Law Enforcement Agencies, all take part, in various ways, to national and EU projects, in the field of CBRN safety and security.

Moreover, the EU level, Italy participates to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism and takes part to EU multinational multiagency exercises such as CREMEX and CURIEX, and, as Member of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Italy receives inspections of chemicals production and stockpiling sites. Finally, the Italian defence is an active member of the European Defence Agency.

The most common feedback from Italian institutions, practitioners, industry and Academia, however, is that there are never enough opportunities to train people and test products and technologies. eNOTICE represent an opportunity to get access to a greater number of training activities, during the year, and to practice in a multinational environment, allowing practitioners, industry and policy makers. On the one side, this will bring a smoother cooperation at the EU level, on the other side, as Italy as well as other Member states are still defining their CBRN policy framework, this can represent a great opportunity to align them in a bottom-up process.

National CBRN policies – Belgium

Currently there is no unified CBRN policy agreed by all stakeholders in Belgium. However the Belgian Federal Crisis Center and the CBRN Platform created on the basis of it, is actively working on development of CBRN policies and emergency plans. This authority responsible for coordination of CBRN emergency preparedness and response with the CBRN Platform under construction, is holding a lot of discussions with stakeholders at all levels, primarily with

operational people, to make the policy effective and usable. A multidisciplinary work group on the operational organization on the field for CBRNe terrorism emergency situations. This working group will build also on experience of the recent eNOTICE Bio Garden exercise, that has been an important catalyzer for CBRNe emergency preparedness.

For the time being, the R/N field is more advanced [16], and C and B fields are under discussion and active preparation.

eNOTICE network of training centres is of high interest for the Belgian Federal Crisis Centre, because the expectation is to be able to cooperate with an integrated environment regarding CBRN training centers in order to organize formation, training and exercises for all actors (strategic, operational) involved in emergency plans. Since the plan is to organize national platforms consisting of collaboration between operational experts, knowledge and training centers and emergency plan coordinators, the national training center(s) should serve as “connection” with foreign training centers. As the scope of CBRNe risks is very broad, and specialized formation, training and exercises may be needed, the network of training centers should provide the necessary interconnections to reorient actors involved in emergency plan to the right center depending on the type of training, exercise needed (based on description of needs).

2 Collaboration of eNOTICE project with DG DEVCO CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative

A proposal of collaboration has been made by the EC regarding the DG DEVCO request to have access to the eNOTICE_ mapping and database of all CBRN training, testing and education (TC) inside the EU. The collaboration between eNOTICE project and DG DEVCO CBRN Centres of Excellence initiative has been positively examined by both parties considering the strategic importance and global benefits of this joint efforts

(a) EC REQUEST FOR eNOTICE JOINT COLLABORATION AND eNOTICE SUPPORT

The rationale of this very unusual but perfectly logical request for a joint resolution of collaboration between the eNOTICE partners and the European Commission, namely the EC_CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative (DG DEVCO), is the need for the CBRN centres of Excellence outside the EU in CBRN training, testing and education sites (TC) inside the EU).

i. At very short notice for DG DEVCO: there is an urgent need to collect the information on CBRN TCs linked to the CBRN CoE (non-EU TC). In parallel, info on EU-TC mapping is needed to provide training inside the EU to the benefit of experts from these CBRN CoE.

ii. At a EU strategic level, implicating DG HOME, DG ECHO and DG DEVCO: TC-related activities are perfectly in line with the CBRN action plan (cf Table 1 here above).

iii. Globally: there is consensus of all parties to avoid parallel and redundant info collection by EC and eNOTICE. It is of note that EC (DEVCO) has already started to collect data on EU-TC, not knowing that this was also part of the eNOTICE activities.

In order to meet this request expressed by the EC, the eNOTICE consortium has solicited from the EC and obtained an amendment to the project Grant Agreement which relates to the following joint tasks:

- To contact and map the CBRN training centres, testing and demonstration sites (TC) inside – under responsibility of eNOTICE - and outside the EU [*responsibility of DEVCO*],
- To characterize the latter capabilities inside [*responsibility of eNOTICE*] and outside the EU [*responsibility of DEVCO*],
- To provide to well-identified DEVCO partners from CBRN Centres of Excellence a security-protected link (individual access with password) to an electronic version of a detailed Questionnaire elaborated by the eNOTICE consortium,
- To collect all TC-related data in a central repository for further exploitation, the terms and conditions of the latter needed still to be defined by both parties.

(b) CONTENT OF THE AMENDMENT:

The final content of the EC-granted amendment is as follows:

“At the request of the European Commission, an additional objective of the Project will be to extend the network of training centres to non-EU countries that are part of European Commission initiatives such as the network of CBRN Centres of Excellence or other initiatives of direct relevance to civil protection or humanitarian nature. This new part of the Project will be carried out without any additional funding from the European Commission. The European Commission will collaborate to this objective by identifying the training centres from non-EU countries, by collecting Project related data through the questionnaire developed by eNOTICE for the EU network of training centres, and by inviting the non-EU training centres to join the eNOTICE network. Project related data obtained through this collaboration should reinforce the quality of Results that will be generated in eNOTICE and it will not require additional deliverables other than those initially planned in eNOTICE Project.”

(c) EC CONTRIBUTION AND SUPPORT IN THE FRAME OF THIS JOINT COLLABORATION:

This joint resolution of collaboration between the eNOTICE partners is associated by a very concrete and direct EC Support to the eNOTICE consortium.

- DG HOME will play the “go between” between the eNOTICE consortium and the national CBRN focal point of EU Member States who regularly meet at the Security Advisory board (cf CBRN action plan 2017, Objective 4, point 4.1 Creation of an EU CBRN security network). By cross checking the eNOTICE data on the EU training centres, testing and demonstration sites, these focal points will give a stronger hand to data collection on EU-TC, and strengthen the database quality. This approach combine indeed the EC_top-down and eNOTICE_bottom-up respective approaches.
- DG DEVCO will provide all data collected by EC on “non-EU TC” to feed the eNOTICE database (cf point a. EC request for eNOTICE collaboration and support; cf text of the amendment here above).

3 Report from the first policy meeting on June 20, 2018

3.1 Context and objectives of the first policy meeting

The policy meeting was organized on June 20, 2018 - the next day after the eNOTICE large scale field exercise Bio Garden hosted by UCL at the military base in Peutie-Vilvoorde, Belgium. The detailed report about the Bio Garden exercise can be found in D4.3 eNOTICE Joint activities planning (submitted in August 2018).

Many EC policy makers were invited to the Bio Garden exercise where they could witness the logic and spirit of the eNOTICE Joint Activities, meet the eNOTICE consortium representatives define priorities for the policy related to CBRN TCs, expectations from the eNOTICE network of CBRN TCs, and desired ways of interaction with the network.

3.2 Speakers and topics on the agenda

The panellists and speakers of the policy meeting on June 20, 2018 were:

Philippe QUEVAUVILLER (DG HOME, eNOTICE Project Officer)

Volker R. QUANTE (JCBRND CoE, eNOTICE, Rapporteur)

Ville PETÄSNORO (DG DEVCO)

Iivy LUUK (DG ECHO)

Wiktor WOJTAS (DG HOME)

Nada MILISAVLJEVIC (DG HOME)

Jean-Luc GALA (UCL-CTMA, eNOTICE – Coord)

Olga VYBORNOVA (UCL-CTMA, eNOTICE – Coord)

One of the main aims of this policy meeting was to better define to what extent this EU network of CBRN-TC and their joint activities are relevant and interesting for the EC-DGs and their representatives.

It was crucial for the members of eNOTICE consortium and network to hear from each DG representative about the vision, strategy and potential interest of each EC Directorate General regarding potential use of this pan-EU Civ-Mil CBRN Training Centre capacity. Accordingly, each DG representative gave a 15 min presentation to share these strategic issues with the audience, such as:

- Against DG own duties, what is the added value in this progressive built-up of a professional pan-EU network of TC?
- What are the expectations and requirements of policy-makers?
- What will be the impact(s) of this network on EU policy, if any?
- Should there be an interaction between the eNOTICE TC network and the European Commission beyond the usual administrative, legal and financial links of a H2020 project and DG HOME?
- If yes, how to create and improve a functional and operational interaction between the TC network and the policy level?
- What would be an example of a very concrete request you would like to address as a priority to the TC network?

- How to strengthen this initiative to make it useful with respect to the CBRN Action Plan and sustainable?
- In one word: how to better interact with EC policy-makers?

3.3 Presentations

All the presentations made at the policy meeting can be found in the Annex of this D4.8.

Presentations were followed by an interactive dialogue between EC representatives and the eNOTICE consortium, other consortium members (e.g. ENCIRCLE) and Bio-Garden participants.

3.4 Discussion

About the current progress of the eNOTICE project

VQ: The first experience after sending out the questionnaire was that it takes long time to receive feedbacks. The overall feedback currently is quite low, we have got 33 filled questionnaires up to now.

- 33 Centres (15 %) filled in the survey, they all expressed their interest in becoming member of the TC network; 19 TC have a fixed installation, 3 a mobile capacity;
- 53 (24 %) requests are pending; these Centres promised to fill in the survey after a personal contact with one of the consortium partners;
- 23 Centres (11 %) refused because of no interest in the network, 14 Centres (6 %) refused because they lack the capacity that is required according to the eNOTICE definition of CBRN Training Centres;
- For 82 Centres no direct, personal contact has been established so far and there was no spontaneous response to the questionnaire sent by mail.

There are good reasons for that. Not all contacted training centres are actively engaged right now. Some training centres are not interested, some simply cannot afford to join the network and open their doors to external participants. Military training centres are in a situation that they often have to ask their superiors first, then their superiors in turn, and it can end up at the ministry level. So of course, all this takes time, but still we are optimistic, because the interest is there, and the wish to overcome obstacles is high.

Some contacted training centres turned out to be not TCs at all, but e.g. experts in CBRN without any training capability.

About the presentations by EC DG representatives from HOME, DEVCO and ECHO

JLG commented on the relevance of the new collaborative agreement between eNOTICE consortium and EC (DG DEVCO):

Attendees to the 6th international meeting of the National Focal Points of the EU CBRN CoEs were invited to follow the Bio Garden exercise as observers. They were all very interested to know more about eNOTICE training centres, facilities, possibilities for training of their countries. So the coming collaboration between eNOTICE and DG DEVCO is highly promising in terms of visibility, accessibility of TC and efficiency of CBRN training.

NM (project officer of iLEAnet project, DG HOME) did not present slides but commented orally on the questions raised above (cf point 3.2 speakers and topics on the agenda):

It is always very intimidating to answer questions like “what is the opinion or expectation of the Commission”, because it is difficult to speak in the name of the whole Commission given differences and different assets of DGs. But the overall idea of what the Commission wants – it is safe and secure EU at the end of the day. And we are all small pieces in this puzzle. All DGs – HOME, ECHO, and DEVCO - have the same goal in mind, just different tasks to reach. DG HOME unit where NM and PQ work is responsible for counter-terrorism and security policy, security research planning, managing security research projects. One of the tasks is to ensure that security research projects are used and useful. It is important because security research is applied research, so it should be applied, it should be used, taken up by security practitioners. We realised in our work that there are many things that are missing. I used to work for the Belgian defence for 18 years, so security research should be used by and useful for defence too. There are many issues that we faced with update of research results by security practitioners. Realising that it is the case and that many things are missing, one of priorities is active involvement of practitioners in the research and development projects. One way to overcome this challenge – we decided to impose involvement of practitioners in projects. Before that practitioners were not happy, because they were formally in a project, but they were not actively involved. So we were looking for other solutions, and we came up with this General Matters call that started last year, and eNOTICE project is part of it, and the idea is to really create networks of practitioners with different calls. In the case of eNOTICE the goal is to provide training facilities that can be used by other research projects for training, testing and demonstration of their results and products. For us (DG HOME) it will be useful to see if these networking projects succeed or fail, if fail why, what needs to be improved, what is missing, what is wrong in the EC programme, what shall be asked in the next iteration of the programme, so that it becomes better. Other networks of practitioners, e.g. iLEAnet, should look into research uptake – see which R&D project can provide any useful results for them that they can use in their everyday professional life. So this is the strategy – to create different types of networks, and these networks should interact with each other! At the last CoU a special session was organised to bring together coordinators of all current networks of practitioners of GM-21, and it will be interesting to see how this network of networks will interact. E.g. firefighters could use eNOTICE training centres, etc. there are bridges here to be made. From the side of our security research unit the strategy is to bridge the research, and networks of practitioners together, and with other sets of practitioners, and with policy makers. In this we can try to help you. The eNOTICE project had already done lots of networking with DGs, it is a very advanced result for a project that started just less than a year ago. The expectation now would be to network with other research projects to see what useful results they can bring.

OV commented on the interface between eNOTICE and ENCIRCLE and the link between eNOTICE activities and research uptake

Indeed uptake of research per se is not an objective of eNOTICE, but we also coordinate the CBRN Cluster part a) project ENCIRCLE, many of the partners of which are present here. ENCIRCLE is based on EDEN results, it is now an umbrella initiative covering all CBRN industry and research, exactly takes care of cataloguing all relevant CBRN technologies, putting together the Industrial and Technological Community and Practitioners and Customers Community. Also there is a direct collaboration of ENCIRCLE with CBRN Cluster part b) RIA projects that actually develop technologies. Thus, we make all relevant links between eNOTICE and CBRN Cluster industry and research.

However, some eNOTICE practitioners, especially military training centres, have concerns about industrial and research projects participation in training activities.

VQ commented on the presentations in general and the military contribution in particular:

JCBRND CoE has already a very close collaboration with DG DEVCO. Now, DG ECHO and DG HOME have also given us a good overview of their strategy. To me, the fact that DGs representatives are not answering precisely the questions sent to this policy meeting participants in advance, only confirms us that we should pursue in the direction that we are already following. If you do not restrict our way, do not indicate us to correct our movement to the left or to the right, then we keep moving on straight. As for the military aspects – we had a concrete issue when DG DEVCO approached us asking if our military centre can provide training to non-EU nations. It already starts to make things complicated. NATO has a network of different partner organisations - it is Partnership for Peace, it is Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Mediterranean Dialogue, Partners across the Globe (PatG) network, so it is a network of networks already, of military activities, and it covers a good portion of the globe. However, some partner nations that work with the EU Centres of Excellence are not member of any of these networks. And then we have to look into it case-by-case individually, when needed we have to raise this issue to the highest military hierarchy of NATO to get approval to closely cooperate with those countries. We, militaries in our centre, are supporting this way, we are willing to address NATO high levels to approve work with these countries, as e.g. the Vietnam delegation that visited us as follow up to the first activities. So we are willing to go that way asking for the green light for these activities.

The second restriction for military training centres is not only dealing with countries that are not part of NATO partner networks, but also dealing with industry and technology developers. Some of militaries have severe restrictions to immediately cooperate with the industry. It's all about corruption prevention, of course, some nations have rather loose approach to that, and others have a very restricted approach. If we want to integrate these research activities, commercial companies, industries into our network, we have to be very careful and balance all this in advance. There can be always a solution how we can integrate them, but it cannot be done in one day. Thus, if we plan to involve research and industry in eNOTICE Joint Activities, it has to be planned in advance. In particular, if we want to develop the project with more emphasis on industry participation, then all the implications related to that have to be carefully considered. But there is always a way through.

PQ commented on the presentations in general and the military contribution in particular:

We have heard the problem from different angles – the network, research policy, NATO point of view on cooperation, I would like to express some news on what has been done and what are the possible perspectives that we need to explore. Practitioners don't need a fancy, expensive but useless "Ferrari" for which they don't have a driving license, but rather need solid reliable "cars to drive on country side roads" – the research results must be pragmatic and affordable. A lot of discussions have been made on how to involve practitioners in early stage of development, validation and testing, and this testing is now coming into the picture, regarding training centres networking. So it's not only the discussion about networking of training capacities, but it is also about identifying what are available capacities in the EU that can be used for testing. This is not only an issue for practitioners, but also for industry SMEs – so that research and development is brought to the training and testing centres that are visible and have established networks. We are also in a strong position regarding the Commission expectation for research, because if we get feedback from training centres regarding research, technologies, tools that had been tested in different centres, then advances can be made in the market dimension as well, because industries and SMEs will be keener to provide solutions that have been validated by practitioners at training centres. In such a way, it's going beyond sole training, but it also impacts on innovation, development and market dimension. The ENCIRCLE project makes the link with this innovation and marketing.

Politically, we have heard different views, CBRN Action Plan has priorities in training capacities mapping, cross-border and cross-disciplinary exercises. DG HOME works closely with the EEAS, with EDA, and they in turn work with inter-governmental agencies, and we are trying to support as much as we can the implementation of the CBRN Action Plan in the research. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism and ERCC also do their best to take up most of the research and to have concrete recommendations. Although there are strong links with NATO, these are not yet explored sufficiently. In the research programme, it is obvious that when we are mixing different types of actors, we have much stronger capacity to identify topics that have a chance to get access to different types of stakeholders, and to have, at the end, more chance to be positively perceived by the users. Technologies developed this way will find easier way to the market. We are now in the position to build something very formal and very strong, it is an opportunity to reach our goals. It took three years to bring practitioners in the centre of attention, so that they become really involved in research. Now, when we fund research, we look into the ways it will be brought to practitioners. The eNOTICE project has 5 years to go, and it can make very strong difference for these 5 years, I really look forward to this.

I would like to open the discussion to the civilian-military cooperation aspect, because it is a way to ensure that research will be taken up by different entities in the EU, NATO and so on, and to try to see what kind of efficient coordination mechanism could be established. The new work programme 2021 – 2027 is not yet finalised, so there is space to improve the civ-mil collaboration, to improve the research programme to bring these two sides together. If we miss the opportunity to bring them together, these two research programmes (civilian and military) will run in parallel. The eNOTICE project has clearly demonstrated that there is willingness from military actors, civil protection, police forces, firefighters to work together, this is absolutely clear. So we need to use this convincing bottom-up example to further discuss how to strengthen it, and then bring it up to the policy level. I did that to the Community of Users, it started very informally, something like 50 people gathering, now there are hundreds of members, and it is coming to something that will hopefully make a difference. The eNOTICE project is in this situation with the network initiative that can make a difference. We and our colleagues from DG ECHO and DG DEVCO are looking now at how to prepare the grounds to merge efforts and to better coordinate activities.

JLG commented on the new CBRN pole currently developed by / inside DG ECHO:

Question for IL (DG ECHO): I learnt recently that DG ECHO is also developing a CBRN expertise, it looks like something new that we were not aware of before, so how would we, eNOTICE, best interface with you in this area? I assume that dealing with CBRN, you need to link with experts and various actors in the field both inside and outside the EU, including within your EUCPM task. It is not clear to me if we have to interface with you at this stage now, and if you believed the answers is yes, then how should we do it?

IL: Indeed we do work in CBRN area, and the Voluntary Pool area is the main operational part of that work. According to the existing legislation, the Voluntary pool has a start-up configuration. In this configuration there are certain CBRN capacities that Member States have defined as “this is what we need to have, this is what is the minimum”. So it is CBRN detection and sampling, CBRN decontamination, and also CBRN USAR – search and rescue under CBRN conditions. As I mentioned, we are undergoing legislation review now, so it is possible that start-up configuration will change, but either way it’s going to be reviewed. And this is also one of the obligations we have under the CBRN Action Plan.

As for the expectations for eNOTICE: we have found that CBRN capabilities in Member States lie in many different sectors. They are in law enforcement, in civil protection, in military sector, also some of the hospitals have biological capability. So we will encourage you very much to include all the relevant sectors and actors in your network. This is something that we try to

facilitate on the EU level, especially in cooperation with first response communities, but also including militaries as much as possible. Of course there are some sensitivities in this, and taking it into account and respecting that, it will be very important to include all those actors and sectors. I was very encouraged to hear that you have both bottom-up and top-down approach in the part, as it can really help you to have this broad scope, it is necessary.

JLG comment on the new Security Advisory Board (SAG) recently set up by the Commission to create a CBRN support network:

Are you involved in SAG? The CBRN Security Advisory Group? So that would be an interface that we can have with you

VW: In the SAG there are all relevant DGs, and some external actors are sometimes invited, so it will be easy to establish collaboration.

Liz Benson (West Midlands Police, UK – eNOTICE project partner) commented on the interest of having an overview European TC capacities and capabilities and of the endorsement of the EC when inviting them to join the eNOTICE network .

I think what eNOTICE project will give is risk mitigation for some of your work, because by profiling training centres we show what capability and capacity is available for which country, which is very interesting. I wonder if the project would be able to have some endorsement from your DGs to show interest, so that when we contact training centres we can show them European global enthusiasm.

VW: in our Action Plan, one of the actions is to map training capabilities in the EU. Basically that's what you are doing in your project. What Volker mentioned, and I mentioned as well in my presentation, we would like that our CBRN security coordinators that are delegated, nominated by their Member States, to verify, to help you to reach people who are not responsive sometimes for different reasons, so that would be sort of validation of your results in the project in a sense that we are interested in and we support your work, and we would like to use the results of your work for our purposes. We have to discuss precisely what would be the best approach to do that, but we would like that your results are official results supporting the implementation of the CBRN Action Plan, and in order to do that we want it as complete and as detailed as possible. I think to reach that it's to have some kind of endorsement from our side, because I am sure some of you experienced that – if somebody comes from a project, it's often not so easy to get replies than if you come as a representative of the European Commission. So I am sure there can be mutual benefits of this solution.

Someone from the audience commenting on very heterogeneous civ-mil cooperation across the EU and on the new NATO Framework Nations Concept

A suggestion for Philippe and a question for Volker: I think there is going to be a mapping document for different nations related to the civil-military cooperation, between those nations which never had civilian and military forces working together for legislative or historical reasons. France and Belgium fit into this category, they perhaps require encouragement. Some nations do civ-mil very well as it is part of their legislation, like, e.g. for Czech Republic. They could have a spokesperson to be the showcase of what can be achieved. So if you can have a mapping document that gives an idea to countries in terms of civ-mil cooperation, it would help a lot.

A question to Volker: there is a big change in the NATO Framework Nations Concept. I know that military authorities have been busy trying to harmonise training across NATO nations, there is a lot of expertise that can be exploited there. How does the Commission and eNOTICE engage with what is going on with this revolution of the framework nations concept, how do

they get involved in exercises, how is the change Commission is trying to do matches the change that NATO is trying to do?

VQ: It's a very specific question, thank you very much for that. I think at the moment our centre is the main link between the activities in both areas. We are one of the supporting elements in the Framework Nations concept. In the CBRN cluster, we have different nations mainly from the military side, cooperating, and we are one of the handful consortium members of eNOTICE – one of the actors on the military side of the eNOTICE network. The challenge at the moment is, as you rightly said, that not all nations are already going that way between the civil and military cooperation. The eNOTICE project is focusing on that, bringing civil and military TCs together, bridging that gap, trying to improve that cooperation. The Framework Nation concept is still focusing on the military side of it. We are very aware of the challenges that are connected to that, we are in close contact with the Framework Nation Concept, the cluster support cell. Our advice that we are giving to them is heard, and I think that in the near future the activities of the FNC cluster should and could be well coordinated with the interests of the eNOTICE project as well. For the big exercise that you mentioned, that will take place in September, this close coordination has not yet come that far, and however we are aligning our ideas.

PQ: I would like to react to what you said about how the road mapping is used and what opportunities it can bring. It's quite sure that in October-November we will have a complete view of the Horizon 2020 2014-2017, as well as capacity building projects of ISF [*EN: Internal Security Fund*], LIFE [*EN: The LIFE programme is the EU's funding instrument for the environment and climate action*], Interreg [*EN: Interreg Europe helps regional and local governments across Europe to develop and deliver better policy*], and so on. It is a huge number of projects. With respect of the in-depth analysis of the civilian and military cooperation we certainly need help. In the context of the Community of Users development we hope that next year it will become more politically visible. There will be a working group on CBRN, and I trust I will have support in this respect, because it is quite unusual, I cannot do that alone, but it can have a strong impact. So I address this invitation also to you, when I will be calling for help.

Clive Goodchild (from ENCIRCLE consortium) commenting on whether the post-crisis recovery is overlooked issue:

Question on policy and eNOTICE: what activities shall be made around recovery? I don't see much in the Action Plan about recovery side. When it comes to training and exercise - what most people tend to do is to ensure response or detection. But when we look at the events like in Salisbury, three months after the small event, the scenes have still not been released back to the public.

OV: Maybe it's a question to eNOTICE consortium – do your TCs ever look into the recovery side?

Liz Benson (WMP): In the UK we test it in exercises, and we transition to recovery every year with the question. I think that our eNOTICE platform will be a perfect place to encourage people to think about it and it is the recommendation.

VQ: I might add a bit to this question. From the military point of view we are definitely dealing with the recovery phase. If I look at our own centre – the JCBRND CoE in Czech Republic, we are offering life agent training that focuses on detection, identification and a small portion of decontamination, but we for sure do not cover the whole range of real recovery as that would exceed our training capabilities. The biggest CBRN exercise that NATO has ever seen, that is

coming up in September, that for sure covers different phases of recovery, but of course it focuses on military aspects. So, looking from a purely military view, I dare say that there we have an area which we can still improve.

WW: In my DG HOME unit, we focus on other phases of prevention of attack, on better protection against the attack, including detection, so we don't really deal with recovery in the terrorism unit. To be honest, during the meetings of the Advisory Group where we have all Member States represented, I don't not hear often anybody mentioning recovery topic. The Action Plan comes from the Commission, but it is also based on our discussions with Member States. Some Member States once sent us a letter saying that this is one of many topics they are interested in, but still it is not something we deal with in the DG HOME terrorism unit.

OV: so then the recommendation will be to focus some exercises on recovery.

IL: if I may just extend to what DG HOME said. The reason why it is not extended to recovery and reconstruction, lies in the way emergency response in general is usually built up in Member States. Recovery is something that is usually in the hands of local authorities as it does not necessarily include specialized capabilities. It is when the emergency state is over, that the recovery begins. However, CBRN is unique in a sense that, as Volker mentioned, there is one component that overlaps with emergency response and recovery – it is decontamination. So, in that sense emergency responders do recovery work in terms of decontamination, but we would like to know if DG HOME is planning to do any kind of mapping? No? OK!. Of course Member States have this capability, I am not sure to what extent it is mapped and to what extent it is to be mapped at the EU level, but this capability clearly exists.

VP: And quickly from the external perspective - it is of course a topic of great interest for many partner countries around the world. You can read in the news that there are many CBRN incidents happening around the world, and DG DEVCO supports partner countries around the world in resilience and building capabilities to better cope with post-crisis and post-incident situation. The CoE initiative is a bit the same as for DG ECHO – it is part of first responder toolkit on decontamination. But indeed this recovery aspect is something that needs more attention in the future.

PQ: from the research perspective we have very little activities in recovery part. It is clear that we are mainly looking at the upstream prevention, preparedness and response, and recovery is not part of the research program. We have a possibility to look by the end of the year at what has been funded from the social funds for capacity building projects and see if there are any projects dealing with recovery. We maybe (yes, a lot of maybe), need to have stronger links between different instruments with respect to cross-checking projects dealing with recovery, but we are not yet at this stage, so we take this point home.

JLG commented on the insertion of CBRN-related medical aspects in eNOTICE:

We have very little discussed about the medical consequences of CBRN action, and the need for medical first responders to train for CBRN and in the CBRN context. Of course this topic is largely related to DG SANTE, we all know it, but is the health aspect included in this eNOTICE network? In the strategical CBRN Plan, these aspects are not included

PQ: there is certainly nothing that prevents medical response teams from being part of eNOTICE network, though I understand it is specific. My recommendation is that you speak not only with DG SANTE, but also to the DG RESEARCH which has such program, I can facilitate you the contact. That would help us to anticipate what will happen not yet in the next

calls, because that is already “cooked”, but can be open in Horizon Europe. I am pretty sure that it will be a welcome initiative.

NM: actually we have a network of practitioners – medical first responder teams - a new network NO FEAR that started this year within the General Matters call. This network, will also see how research can help and how they can help research. The eNOTICE project can connect with NO FEAR.

OV: actually this network is present here. Brigitte, do you deal with the consequence of CBRN actions in your network?

BS: yes, we address medical aspects and impacts of the CBRN actions in the NO FEAR network. This includes consequences, training and preparedness as well as social and human issues related to CBRNe threats and incidents. Practitioners and suppliers interested in these topics are most welcome to join the NO FEAR network. The coordinator is UPO in Italy, the supplier and academia network is coordinated by Rinicom, the decision-maker and practitioner network is coordinated by DSU in Romania.

Clive: a comment – there was a mention of modules now, I don’t know if it still exists. In EDEN, there was a training curriculum framework that was done by CBRN centre, and I might provide you a framework of training modules for the mapping.

JLG, OV: thank you for excellent suggestion.

Close of the session.

3.5 Bio-Garden policy-meeting: Key points and take home messages

1. The active collaboration between the EC (namely HOME and DEVCO) and eNOTICE for the feeding and use of database on EU TC has already proved its relevance during the Bio-Garden exercise of June 2018

Attendees to the 6th international meeting of the National Focal Points of the EU CBRN CoEs were invited by eNOTICE as observers of the Bio-Garden exercise. Many of them expressed a strong interest and wish to solicit the EU CBRN training, testing and demonstration sites for their own practitioners.

2. What about the new CBRN activities of DG ECHO and a potential interface with eNOTICE?

- DG ECHO focuses mainly on the operational part of the CBRN domain through the Voluntary Pool, which is in a start-up configuration with basic needs expressed by MS, i.e. CBRN detection, CBRN decontamination and CBRN USAR. This configuration is now being revised and might change in the future, as planned in the CBRN action Plan. Regarding eNOTICE a useful link should be made with CBRN capabilities of MS in different sectors (e.g. the first responders including civil protection, military and health).
- DG ECHO, like any other DG, is represented in the CBRN SAG, which will help interface with eNOTICE through the CBRN national contact points.

3. The recovery phase seems to be overlooked both in the CBRN plan as well during training and exercises?

- In the UK, this is tested during exercises but eNOTICE should be an appropriate consortium to push this aspects forward.
- The militaries are dealing with the recovery (e.g. when training with life agents: there is an overlap between detection and recovery through decontamination) but this does not cover the whole range of recovery. It is a rather limited spectrum fitting with (limited) training capacities and focusing only on military aspects.
- This aspect does not seem to be a priority for MS when considering the topics defined as a priority by national delegates representing MS at the SAG. This lack of priority is therefore also reflected in the CBRN Action plan, and therefore not a topic considered by DG HOME.
- DG ECHO consider the recovery as the responsibility of MS local authorities which have the capabilities. As for the militaries, decontamination is part of the recovery phase and is carried out by first responders.
- DG DEVCO finds this aspect interesting as its duty is to support partner countries in their efforts to be resilient to post-crisis/ post-incident situation through capacity-building. Like for the militaries and DG ECHO, decontamination is a toolkit used by first responders.
- DG HOME has no research topic targeting specifically the recovery phase. This point is not part of the research programme but could have been part of the capacity-building programme (social funds). In any case, this needs further assessment
- Consequently, this point deserves maybe some attention in the future and could be a topic addressed by eNOTICE in future joint exercises.

4. Likewise, the medical consequences of CBRN interventions on practitioners and affected populations do not seem to be topic of concern for eNOTICE?

- DG HOME believes that medical response teams can certainly play a role in eNOTICE and recall that there is a network of medical first responder's team (project NO FEAR). eNOTICE should link with NO FEAR.
- The recommendation is also to make a link with DG SANTE and with DG RESEARCH which has a specific program. Whereas the latter program is already written, it could be addressed in Horizon Europe.

4. One of the current issues of the TC capacities and capabilities mapping is the little feedback received. The many reasons for this difficulty have been identified and discussed. The solution is to have the endorsement of the EC to eNOTICE. This endorsement is granted through the new collaborative agreement with eNOTICE and will be witnessed by the support of the *CBRN national focal points* - also called *CBRN security coordinators*, who are nominated or delegated by the MS- . These national focal points who meet regularly at the CBRN SAG will be tasked by the EC to supervise the mapping and help to complete it. Their involvement and contribution will help improve data quality and completeness through data cross-checking and personal contact with their own national TCs (top down approach). This is also the interest of the EC which is at the same time the competent authority for the CBRN action plan, the party requesting the mapping to fulfil this plan, a real “persuasive power” over EU TC.

5. The question of the expectation of the Commission for eNOTICE is a crucial but difficult one considering the complexity and size of the EC (i.e. many DGs, many actors, different tasks, priorities and objectives).

- The common objective shared by all stakeholders is “a safe and secure EU at the end of the day” but there are many ways to reach this goal.
- In the DG HOME fields of counter-terrorism, security and policy, it is crucial that solutions developed by research projects be useful and used by practitioners! This implies their active involvement at the early phases of the novel technological developments, a compatibility of proposed solution with their operational requirements, as well as affordability.
- The latter point prompted the EC to launch new calls dealing with the creation of several “network of practitioners”.
- This in turn contributed to the launch of eNOTICE and to a clear and direct EC’s expectation for eNOTICE: to provide training demonstration and testing facilities for the solutions developed by other networks – researchers, SMEs, and industries -, hence to facilitate the research uptake and the access of these solutions to the market. In close interaction with other networks, eNOTICE is therefore expected to help disseminate research results (i.e. new CBRN solutions), and ensure that research activities respond to the operational needs in the CBRN area.
- To achieve this goal eNOTICE will have to pursue the build-up of a dynamic interface with EC DGs, national authorities and policy-makers, researchers, industries and networks of practitioners. In that respect, the very strong link with ENCIRCLE, and with the CoU led by DG HOME is highly relevant in terms of practitioners-guided innovation, successful development and access to the market.
- A global and fair evaluation of the successes and failures will be regularly needed.

6. The question of the military participation to eNOTICE has also raised very interesting comments

- NATO, which participates to eNOTICE via the contribution of the JCBRND CoE, is, itself a genuine network of networks, covering a significant part of the world.
- Issue related to eNOTICE dealing cooperating with the CBRN Centre of Excellences initiative of DEVCO: some nations working with these CBRN CoE are not part of the global NATO network. Approval to training delivery to these countries will therefore require approval by the highest NATO authorities. Not impossible but not straightforward either, even if the will of militaries here is not at all at stake
- A second restriction regarding the eNOTICE activities is the link with industries and technology developers. While some nations have for their defence department a relative flexible position in this respect, others are highly reluctant to integrate research activities and commercial partners, like industries, in the network. This needs to be anticipated and requires a careful planning.
- The interaction between eNOTICE and the new NATO Nation Framework Concept) [*Editor’s note: “Framework Nations Concept” (FNC) is currently one of the driving paradigms of multinational defence cooperation. All nations retain full sovereignty, rather than building on a “European army”*] has been commented on. The FNC is currently exclusively focusing on the military aspects whereas eNOTICE is already engaged in a civ-mil cooperation. Anyhow, those from the militaries engaged in the FNC are perfectly aware of the need to consider a strengthened civ-mil cooperation in

the future. This could be a golden opportunity for eNOTICE to be integrated in this new dynamic.

- A true civ-mil cooperation exists only in a few MS (e.g. Czech Republic). However, in those MS where this has never been on the agenda – e.g. BE and FR, it is now being assessed as a valuable option in the future. eNOTICE is, in that respect, a model of civ-mil cooperation which could be a testbed for the future for those MS. Civ-mil cooperation will be assessed in the frame of Horizon 2020 programme 2014-2017 and other capacity building projects (*ISF [EN: Internal Security Fund]*, *LIFE [EN: The LIFE programme is the EU's funding instrument for the environment and climate action]*, *Interreg [EN: Interreg Europe helps regional and local governments across Europe to develop and deliver better policy]*).
- This civ-mil cooperation will also be on the agenda of the CoU in year 2019 with a dedicated CBRN working group and the active involvement of COU participants.

7. Other policy aspects

- The CBRN area is approached from various angles by the commission and the different DGs (CBRN Action plan; EUCPM and ERCC), inter-governmental agencies and institutions like EEAS and EDA. All try to work together. The EC develops also strong links with NATO.
- Mixing many different partners and actors in the research programme increases the chance to cover the need expressed by the many stakeholders, including the users. As said above (cf point 3. expectation of the Commission for eNOTICE), practitioners are now requested to play a key role in orienting CBRN research and innovation towards real operational requirements. The eNOTICE project can and should contribute to this new dynamic.
- Civ-mil cooperation will be part of the new programme 2012-2027. While not yet finalized, its success will heavily depend on the quality of this cooperation. The eNOTICE project has already catalysed and sustained this positive dynamic. In this respect, eNOTICE appears as a very good example of what needs to be done in the near future with a bottom-up approach, exerting a leverage effect for the EC to link it with the policy level, as was done by the CoU.

Conclusions and way ahead

The first policy-meeting was held on June 20, 2018 - the next day after the Joint Activity Bio Garden. The approach was innovative, giving the floor the main DGs representatives and asking them to answer to a set of questions specifically focusing on points of interest. Those questions dealt with the immediate and mid/long-term future of eNOTICE and a better understanding of DGs' expectations towards eNOTICE. This enabled to confirm the extremely high strategic value of this project and related network in terms of European CBRN training and education capacity, novel dynamic of practitioners-guided innovation, and future civ-mil cooperation. This meeting also confirmed, if need be, the perfect fitting of eNOTICE with the commission strategy to develop a more efficient integrative approach embedding policy-makers, researchers, developers and practitioners.

The way ahead will be the continuation of eNOTICE original tasks while maintaining this link with the Commission to benefit from this high degree of interest and confidence in eNOTICE. We will attentively follow the development of the CBRN action plan and the work done at the

CoU as both have proved to be highly congruent with the eNOTICE work and tasks. The eNOTICE network is expected to provide training demonstration and testing facilities for the solutions developed within other networks, contributing to or stimulating the development of solutions useful for practitioners and so pushing those to the market. To ease its work, the consortium will receive the support of DG HOME who will facilitate information sharing by CBRN Security Coordinators on national training capacities.

National CBRN policies need to be considered in detail, to establish common points and cooperation between MS, with the intermediary operational key role of CBRN training centres, will need to be fed in the following months to strive for better harmonisation of procedures between EU –MS as planned.

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